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Keyword List

Architecture, Protocol, Implementation, API, Security, Trust, Privacy
Protocols and Concrete Architecture Executive Summary

This document specifies a set of protocol level interoperability profiles, usually leveraging open standards, deployment scenarios, APIs, and other considerations that constitute the official way to deploy version 1 of TAS³ architecture, see [TAS3ARCH]. The purpose of defining these specifics is to enable multiple independent implementations of TAS³ to be wire protocol interoperable (and to limited extent also API interoperable). TAS³ reference implementation and reference deployment will behave essentially as described in this document.

The TAS³ architecture is designed to be standards, protocol, data and application agnostic so that any protocol capable of implementing the flows and satisfying the service requirements can potentially be used by any application. However, to build practical systems, different components, possibly from different sources, must speak the same protocols, hence TAS³ provides this profile that allows interoperability at the level of Single Sign-On, Web Service Discovery, Web Service Call, and Authorization. The standardized profile provides the scaffolding where plurality of trust and privacy negotiation mechanisms, policy languages, obligations and other value added features can exist.

The TAS³ API is designed to allow an application programmer to understand how simple it is to "TAS³ enable" his application. It is noteworthy that using the API does not require any in-depth knowledge of the underlying standards, protocols, and profiles, or indeed even of the TAS³ Architecture itself. All these details are taken care of by the API implementation, supplied commercially or in open source. The TAS³ Reference Implementation will be one such API implementation. The APIs will be available in all popular programming languages and platforms.

The simplicity of the API is due to a coherent integration model that shows how the steps from SSO and Authorization all the way to the web service calls work together and are able to pass necessary credentials and tokens "behind the scenes" by the use of session and other state information. Many design parameters that could have been handled by yet another argument to the API functions, are in fact handled by configuration file, with sensible default values, and automated discovery, trust negotiation, and trust network business processes.

The split between explicit arguments, configurability, and automated processes has been guided by division of concerns between the application programmer and the systems administrator. When automatic mechanisms are used, appropriate manual control point exists elsewhere in the architecture, e.g. automated discovery is kept in check with explicit authorization.

We provide guidance regarding possible integration and deployment scenarios and illustrate how TAS³ Architecture can be deployed in a resilient and redundant way.

Neither this document nor the TAS³ Architecture [TAS3ARCH] mandate use of a particular deployment or software architecture (although the integration scenarios suggest a recommended one), implementers are free to organize their software and deployment in other ways as long as the wire protocol compatibility is maintained and all signature generation and validation steps, as well as trust determinations, and authorizations are implemented.

The Annex gives some example protocol messages.
1 Introduction

This document describes the TAS³ Concrete Architecture and protocol choices in a normative and prescriptive way. It also describes the official, but not exclusive, TAS³ API generically and for selected programming language bindings. Any implementation or deployment claiming "TAS³" compliance MUST abide by this document as well as [TAS3ARCH], and [TAS3COMPLIANCE]. A deployment usually has to satisfy, as well, requirements of the Trust Operator’s, see [TAS3GLOS], Governance Agreement and certification procedures, some of which concern the software implementation and others the deployment’s organizational properties. Use of TAS³ brand is governed by a separate TAS³ Brand Agreement.

This document uses the keywords (e.g. MUST, SHOULD) of [RFC2119]. All text is normative unless expressly identified as non-normative. Prose and specification has precedence over examples. In general the examples should not be assumed normative unless no normative specification for the subject matter is available.

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1.1 Standardized Wire Protocol Interfaces

TAS³ emphasizes wire protocol interoperability in following key areas

1. Single Sign-On (SSO) and Single Logout (SLO)
2. Authorization request-response
3. ID Mapping and Discovery
4. Web service call
5. Audit bus reporting and audit trail querying
6. Delegation
7. Metadata, registrations, declarations of attribute needs, declarations of attribute availability

In some areas TAS³ recognizes interoperability need, but leaves it up to the business processes, adaptive techniques, and involved parties to agree specific means. These include:

- Policy and obligations languages and vocabularies (although we suggest XACML and SOL1, see section 2.10, as one alternative, supported by the reference implementation)
- Trust and Privacy Negotiation protocol and metrics or scores (although we suggest TrustBuilder and some XACML extensions, see section 2.6)
- Application ("payload") protocols and data formats
- Format of the local audit trail
- Business Process Modelling techniques and languages

TAS³ recognizes the usefulness of a consistent user experience, e.g. in Dashboard, SSO, consent, trust and privacy negotiation, policy editing, etc., but this document does not attempt to prescribe these aspects.
1.2 Composition and Co-location of Architectural Components

When implementing practical systems, it often turns out that many of the architecturally designed boxes are in fact implementable by one software module. For example, with reference to Fig-2.3 of [TAS3ARCH], it is clear that a software module called “Service Requester” may exist, realizing Rq-PEP-Out, Rq-PEP-In, and Stack components all together without them being necessarily separable. Such composition does not harm interoperability as those submodules of Service Requester were always meant to be part of the same process and to communicate via function call interfaces. Indeed, the official TAS3 API, see section 3, lumps all these in one function call: \textit{tas3\_call()}. However all external interfaces from \textit{tas3\_call()}, such as authorization, discovery, and web service call, do speak standard protocols as profiled in this document.

It is ok for an implementation to compose, as an optimization, components that were meant to be wire protocol interfaces (see section 1.1), e.g. reach authorization by function call interface instead of XACML, as long as the implementation makes the same interface available over-the-wire by a mere configuration change (no recompile required/allowed).

From protocol perspective co-location of services (having two distinct service processes running on the same server hardware, or even running as separate processes under the same web server) does not present any problem, save for the complications of using nonstandard TCP/IP ports or requirement of configuring multiple IP addresses to same host.

From risk management and excessive visibility, or fat target, perspective, see \textit{T161-Panopticon} threat in [TAS3COMPLIANCE], some services clearly should not be co-located. Division of responsibilities becomes important here and any two roles played by one system entity where they are co-located must not have a conflict of interest. In particular, the following are incompatible for co-location

- anything vs. Audit
- SP vs. IdP (some exceptions apply)
- SP vs. ID Mapping and Discovery
- SP vs. Delegation
- IdP vs. Authorization (some exceptions apply)

Some services can be safely co-located, and often are:

- IdP often includes Attribute Authority, ID Mapping, Discovery, and fat client Authentication Service. Although an IdP should not pretend to be a Policy Enforcement Point, it is clear that an IdP can exert such control by refusing to issue tokens that are necessary for functioning of the rest of the architecture.
- SP and PEP are natural partners, indeed different facets of the same process
2 Protocols and Profiles

To complement the specification of protocols here, the reader may want to consult Fig-8.18 in [HafnerBreu09] for an overview of the functionality available in various specifications.

The choice of protocols has been guided by commitment to open standards as recommended in section 2 of [UNDP07]. This also serves to address Reqs. D1.2-2.4-MultiVendor, D1.2-2.5-Platform, and D1.2-2.6-Lang.

2.1 Supported Authentication and Login Systems

This section addresses Reqs. D1.2-2.18-AnCredi, D1.2-6.12-Sec, D1.2-7.3-An, and, D1.2-7.10-Target.

2.1.1 System Entity Authentication

TAS3 adopts X.509v3 public key certificates as primary means of authenticating system entities. This will apply over TLS and ClientTLS connections and may also apply in digital signatures.

For bilateral authentication Client TLS MUST be supported. HTTP Basic authentication MAY be supported.

2.1.2 SAML

Given the already broad adoption of SAML 2.0 by the eGovernment and academic communities across the world (e.g. DK, NZ, FI, etc.), this choice is effectively already made for us. By choosing SAML 2.0 we enable many existing eGovernment and academic projects easily to become TAS3 compliant in future.

1. TAS3 adopts SAML 2.0 Assertions, see [SAML2core], as primary and recommended token format. Alternatives such as SAML 1.1 or Simple Web Token (SWT) [Hardt09] were considered either obsolete or not yet mature. In future we may consider supporting SWT and X509 attribute certificates as token format. This will become especially relevant when architecture is extended to support RESTful services approaches.

2. TAS3 adopts SAML 2.0 as primary and RECOMMENDED SSO system, see [SAML2core]. (Req. D1.2-3.10-JITPerm)

3. TAS3 RECOMMENDS that SAML 2.0 implementations are Liberty Alliance Certified.

4. SAML 1.0, 1.1 [SAML11core], 1.2, as well as Liberty ID-FF 1.2 [IDFF12] MAY be supported

5. Redirect - POST SSO profile MUST be supported by all front channel participants, see [SAML2prof] and [SAML2bind].

6. Redirect - Artifact - SOAP SSO profile MUST be supported in IdP and SHOULD be supported in Front End (SP), see [SAML2prof] and [SAML2bind].

7. Redirect Single Logout Profile MUST be supported, see [SAML2prof] and [SAML2bind].

8. IdP Extended Profile, see [SAML2conf], namely IdP Proxying, MUST be supported

9. Other SAML profiles MAY be supported

10. SAML metadata MUST be supported, see [SAML2meta]

11. Well Known Location (WKL) method of metadata publishing MUST be supported, see [SAML2meta] section 4.1 "Publication and Resolution via Well-Known Location", p.29, for normative description of this method. Support for WKL method for metadata acquisition is RECOMMENDED.
N.B. Publishing metadata using WKL at its most basic form is as simple as placing a hand edited metadata file in the web root at the place referenced by the EntityID of the site. Many software packages handle this automatically and may even generate the metadata dynamically, on the fly.

12. In redirect binding [RFC1951] deflate compression MUST be used. [RFC1952] format MUST NOT be used.

2.1.2.1 Authentication Request

1. MUST use NameIDPolicy/@Format of Persistent ("urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent") when implementing Pull Model (Req. D1.2-7.8-NoColl).

2. MUST use NameIDPolicy/@Format of Transient ("urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient") when implementing Linking Service model.

3. MUST set NameIDPolicy/@SPNameQualifier

4. MUST set NameIDPolicy/@AllowCreate flag at all times true

5. SHOULD not set IsPassive flag (in some cases there may be justified reasons to do otherwise)

6. MUST use AssertionConsumerServiceIndex

7. MUST NOT use ProtocolBinding or AssertionConsumerServiceURL

8. Step-up authentication, using Authentication Context Class References MUST be supported.

9. SHOULD use AttributeConsumingServiceIndex attribute, which refers to a section of the metadata, as way of selecting the attributes that are returned in the authentication response. Reader should be aware that new proposals for solving this issue more dynamically have been submitted to OASIS Security Services Technical Committee, e.g. [Kellomaki08]. It should also be noted that the returned attributes are always at discretion of the IdP.

2.1.2.2 Authentication Response

The authentication request will be responded with an assertion that satisfies following:

1. MUST contain <sa:AuthnStatement>

2. MUST specify the Level of Authentication as AuthnStatement/AuthnContext/AuthnContextClassRef.

3. MUST use the LoA profile [SAML2LOA] to return LoA to the SP.

4. SHOULD have AudienceRestriction/Audience element referencing the SP.

5. MAY contain <AttributeStatement> detailing user's attributes as relevant to SP and/or requested using AttributeConsumingServiceIndex.

6. SHOULD have an <AttributeStatement> containing a discovery bootstrap (attribute named "urn:liberty:disco:2006-08:DiscoveryEPR" whose value is an endpoint reference) as described in [Disco2] section 4 "Discovery Service ID-WSF EPR conveyed via a Security Token".

7. MAY have additional Attribute Statements conveying other endpoint references. Rather than providing additional EPRs at SSO, using discovery is RECOMMENDED. If additional EPRs are passed, the attributes SHOULD be named "urn:liberty:disco:2006-08:DiscoveryEPR" even if they do not refer to discovery service. The SP, when seeing "urn:liberty:disco:2006-08:DiscoveryEPR" attribute MUST look at the Attribute/AttributeValue/EndpointReference/Metadata/ServiceType element to determine the type of the end point reference. The SP SHOULD consider any attribute whose value is an <a:EndpointReference> to be a bootstrap.
2.1.3 Shibboleth

Shibboleth MAY be supported. Shibboleth based on SAML 2.0 is RECOMMENDED. Supporting Shibboleth enables higher education institutions to adopt TAS³ with minimal reconfiguration and reinvestment.

Shibboleth does not currently (2009) support Single Logout. As a condition of TAS³ compliance, such support should be added (please contribute any such work to the Shibboleth open source implementation so that this caveat can be deleted). However, a TAS³ compliant Trust Network may waive this requirement after analysis of the impact and a pondered decision (i.e. its easier to implement it than to get lawyers to agree).

Shibboleth does not officially support Well Known Location method of metadata publication, but any Shibboleth deployment can satisfy this requirement by simply hand crafting a metadata file and making it available on their web server at the EntityID URL.

We have not fully validated all use cases with Shibboleth. Specific points of contention include lack of full user identification, e.g. statement that User is a student or staff member of university, without giving out a persistent pseudonym. While a valid approach that better protects the user’s privacy than the use of a persistent ID, it may not be able to address all the use cases, especially in the commercial world where service providers wish to link a user’s requests together.

2.1.4 eID and Other Smart Cards

European eID cards and other smart cards are supported as an authentication method available at SAML 2.0 IdP.

2.1.5 One-Time-Password Tokens

One-Time-Password Tokens, such as RSA Tokens or Yubikey, are supported as an authentication methods available at SAML 2.0 IdP.

2.1.6 OpenID

OpenID [OpenID] MAY be supported. If supported, OpenID 2.0 MUST be used as earlier versions have known security flaws.

It should be noted that OpenID’s globally unique identifier model does not provide privacy protection.

We have not validated whether it is possible to implement TAS³ architecture using OpenID. One specific point of uncertainty is passing the IM bootstrap token at SSO time. No native OpenID mechanism is known to exist (standardized; ad-hoc approaches are known). One suggestion, applicable to the RESTful binding would be to use OAuth.

2.1.7 CardSpace / InfoCard and WS-Federation

Card Space MAY be supported. If supported, at least SAML 2.0 token format MUST be supported. The token MUST also support passing IM / Discovery bootstrap token.

2.1.8 CA / Netegrity Siteminder Proprietary SSO

Siteminder MAY be supported. However, we have not validated whether it is possible to implement TAS³ architecture using Siteminder. Prospects do not look particularly good as the Siteminder protocol and product can not easily be configured to convey the IM bootstrap token. However, the same vendor sells a SAML2 solution, so ask for that instead.

• Not standards compliant, but by far the most relevant player on the market
2.1.9 Citrix, Sun, and other proprietary SSO

MAY be supported. However, we have not validated whether it is possible to implement TAS³ architecture using these.

2.1.10 Web Local Login

We have not validated whether it is possible to implement TAS³ architecture using local login approach. The local login approach has many problems, including:

- Each site has separate login so more burden to the user
- Users are lazy and use same password on many sites, thus allowing the sites to impersonate (masquerade) their users towards other sites.
- Local logins require local effort to support new better authentication methods.
- Local logins necessitate local user database maintenance
- Local logins require password resets to be handled locally

If you must do local login, we recommend using one-time-passwords and the Authentication Service Protocol [SOAPAuthn2] to validate the authentication centrally using an IdP.

2.1.11 Desktop Login

We have not validated whether it is possible to implement TAS³ architecture using desktop login approach. We recommend using one-time-passwords and the Authentication Service Protocol [SOAPAuthn2] to validate the authentication centrally using an IdP.

- Terminal servers: Mind-The-Box, Citrix, Windows TS, etc.
- Active Directory PDC

A backup plan would be to capture the authentication at LDAP or Active Directory level and make the Authentication Service call from this middleware.

The Desktop login approach suffers from similar security problems as the Fat Client Login, which see below.

2.1.12 Fat Client Login

"Fat Client" refers to any non web browser client, e.g. email reading program (as opposed to web mail) or GUI form filling application (as opposed to web GUI). Fat Client scenario often arises with embedded systems, such as medical devices that need to talk to TAS³ network.

The main security problem in Fat Client Login is that the fat client itself becomes an intermediary to the authentication process, handling sensitive credentials. Some notion of Trusted Computing Path may help to address verifying that the fat client is not compromised.

We recommend using one-time-passwords and the Authentication Service Protocol [SOAPAuthn2] to validate the authentication centrally using an IdP. One-time-passwords effectively solve the intermediary problem.

If Fat Client Login is a requirement, Liberty Advanced Client approach, see [AdvClient] and [SOAPAuthn2], SHOULD be used.
2.1.13 User Not Present or Batch Operations

TAS³ specifies some approaches for doing this, see [TAS3D41ID], mainly based on using advanced authorization to obtain discovery token without authenticating the User. Liberty Advanced Client approach, see [AdvClient] and [SOAPAuthn2], SHOULD be used.

2.2 Supported Identity Web Services Systems

The web services must satisfy some technical requirements

- Messages MUST be correlated, so each response is bound to request in an auditable way
  - Message ID correlation
  - Business Process Model and Instance IDs (or context or instance) to allow overarching correlation of several request-response pairs (e.g. to avoid actors who would have conflicts of interest overall that might not be identified when only working at level of individual request-response pairs)
    - PDP can receive this easy enough as an environment parameter and this is needed to support dynamic separation of duties
    - Gap: business process modelling does not express this?
    - Consider URL format hierarchical ID
    - Better typed, like LDAP DN format, or query string

- Requester and Responder MUST be identified (Req 10.4)

- Synchronous web service calls MUST be supported

- Asynchronous calls SHOULD be supported where needed. Business Process Engines will handle asynchrony.

- Subscribe - Notify mechanism SHOULD be supported where needed
  - subscription for events will be vital to pick up errors and notify of events like break the glass
  - subscribe and publish ws-eventing
  - Event bus as a subscribe and publish mechanism

- Maximum availability and use digital signature and encryption technologies, i.e. technical solutions to security and trust problems.

2.2.1 Framework

1. MUST support SOAP 1.2

2. MUST support XML-DSIG [XMLDSIG], a.k.a. RFC3275. In future we may introduce simpler schemes like Simple Web Token [Hardt09]. Using TLS connection stream as an audit trail element is impractical due to volume and inability of implementations to capture it. TLS stream as audit trail may also lead to inadvertent collateral disclosure.

3. MUST support Exclusive XML Canonicalization [XML-EXC-C14N] for purposes of [XMLDSIG].

4. MAY support simple sign [SAML2SimpleSign]. In future we will support Simple Web Token [Hardt09] which is very similar to simple sign.
5. MUST support XML-Enc [XMLENC] for protection of NameIDs and attributes, including bootstraps, as well as assertions, against an active intermediary. The common case in question is a SP that is about to make a web service call. To make such call, the SP must obtain from the discovery service a token that is passed to the web service provider. XML-Enc support allows the discovery service to pass in the encrypted token the pseudonym, and potentially some sensitive attributes, to the web service provider without the intermediary, SP in this case, being able to snoop on this confidential information. This case can not be solved using TLS alone as TLS is point-to-point and for this case TAS3 architecture necessarily specifies an active intermediary.

2.2.2 Liberty ID-WSF

1. MUST support ID-WSF 2.0 [SOAPBinding2]
2. MAY support ID-WSF 1.2
3. An implementation MUST support the following sec mechs, see [SecMech2]:
   - "urn:liberty:security:2005-02:TLS:Bearer"
   - "urn:liberty:security:2006-08:TLS:SAMLV2" (Holder-of-Key, HoK)

A deployment MAY, as a configuration option, choose either.

4. MAY support following sec mechs for testing, but MUST NOT permit their use in production environments:
   - "urn:liberty:security:2005-02:null:Bearer"
   - "urn:liberty:security:2006-08:null:SAMLV2" (Holder-of-Key, HoK)
5. MAY support other TLS [RFC2246] based sec mechs, including ClientTLS.
6. MUST NOT permit non-TLS sec mechs in production environments
7. Implementations SHOULD be Liberty Alliance certified, see [IDWSF2SCR].
9. An implementation MUST support a health check feature. We RECOMMEND that the health check uses the "dry-run" feature mentioned in the previous item.

2.2.3 Bare WS-Security Header or Simplified ID-WSF

1. SHOULD NOT use, as many important security features such as message correlation, replay detection, and identification of endpoints are not supported by this mechanism.
2. Document resultant limitations if not implementing full ID-WSF.

2.2.4 WS-Trust

- MAY support [WSTrust] in general, but MUST support if deploying the particular case of accessing external Credential Validation Service, per [ChadwickSu09]

We have not validated whether it is possible to implement TAS3 architecture using WS-Trust. Clearly WS-Trust can be used as a token exchange protocol, but for this to be interoperable heavy profiling is needed. Users and advocates of WS-Trust should undertake to write such profile.
2.2.5 RESTful Approach

MAY support. We RECOMMEND support on basis of OAuth [OAUTH] and OAuth WRAP [Tom09], but implementers should take in account security advisories published on oauth.net web site. OAuth WRAP is still immature as of this writing (Nov. 2009) and can not be recommended for production use. We have not validated whether it is possible to implement TAS3 architecture using RESTful approach. RESTful enablement is nice to have, but should not compromise elegance of the SOAP solution and may be less capable (i.e. it is enough that the RESTful approach solves front channel use cases). RESTful approach may support more economical token formats such as Simple Web Token (SWT) [Hardt09]. TAS3 project plans to address RESTful binding in future work during 2010.

2.2.6 Message Bus Approach

We see deploying TAS3 services on message bus architecture as feasible. This will be investigated in a future iteration of this deliverable.

2.3 Authorization Systems

This section addresses Reqs. D1.2-2.19-AzCredi and D1.2-2.20-Az. Authorization systems are extensively covered in [TAS3D71IdMAAz].

2.3.1 Authorization Queries

1. MUST support XACML 2.0 [XACML2] request-response contexts for authorization queries
2. MAY support other versions of XACML
3. MAY support XACML policy language
4. MUST support XACML SAML Authorization Query extension [XACML2SAML] in order to allow policies to be dynamically passed to the PDP

All communication between the PEP and PDP will be using SOAP based XACML SAML profile. This profile is mostly independent of rules language. Thus the PERMIS and trust and reputation language...
specificity will be mostly contained within the PDPs themselves. The only exception is the obligation vocabulary which must be understood by the distributed Obligations Services and therefore needs to be standardised. This is a major effort that has already been started in the TAS³ project. On the other hand, the sticky policies, which will be passed over the wire in the protocol exchange, will be engineered such that they transparently pass from the data store to the appropriate field of the XACML request without the PEP proper really having to understand them.

2.3.2 Policy Languages

TAS³ does not mandate any specific policy language. However, consider following possibilities:

1. PDP SHOULD support XACML 2.0 policy language [XACML2]
2. PDP MAY support PERMIS 5.0 policy language
3. PDP MAY support P3P policy language
4. PDP MAY support PrimeLife privacy policies
5. PEP, PDP, and Obligations Service MAY support SOL1, see section 2.10, for obligations
6. CVS MAY support PERMIS Policy CVS Schema (cf. [TAS3D71dMANAz] Appendix 2)

![Hierarchy of policies](attachment:image)

Figure 2.2: Hierarchy of policies

2.4 Trust and Security Vocabularies

Usage of ontologies in TAS³ is thoroughly addressed in [TAS3D22UPONTO], which will map some of these vocabularies.

2.4.1 Levels of Authentication (LoA)

TAS³ recommends the use of the NIST 4 levels of assurance as described in [NIST-SP800-63] and profiled in [SAML2LOA].

TAS³ is working on determining whether and how to support LoA schemes of various European countries.

2.4.2 Vocabularies for Authorization

Some work has been done in RADIUS [RFC2138] and Diameter [RFC3588].

[SAML2context] is mainly about authentication, but authorization is also touched.

This section will be expanded in a future version of this document.

2.4.3 Vocabularies for Basic Attributes (PII)

Use of following vocabularies of PII is RECOMMENDED:
2.4.4 Discovery Vocabularies

Main vocabulary for discovery is the Service Type taxonomy described in [Disco2]. This taxonomy is complemented by discovery options that further describe the service. This vocabulary SHOULD be used when applicable.

Each Liberty service specifies its own Service Type value as well as a number discovery options. For example, see [IDDAP], [IDPP], or [DST21].

This section will be expanded in a future version of this document.

2.4.5 Security and Trust Vocabularies

See [SAML2context] and [SecMech2] for a vocabulary of security mechanisms that MUST be used when applicable.

This section will be expanded in a future version of this document.

2.4.6 Audit Vocabularies

Audit events from RADIUS [RFC2139] and Diameter [RFC3588] are RECOMMENDED for use where applicable.

This section will be expanded in a future version of this document. As audit is active research topic, we benefit from the research during the TAS3 project to specify this section in detail in the final version of this document.

2.5 Realization of the Discovery Function

- MUST support Liberty ID-WSF 2.0 Discovery Service specification [Disco2]
- MAY support [Disco12]

- MAY support UDDI, however this may require significant extensions to UDDI. Such extensions would need to be profiled.

See [NexofRA09], section 5.4 “The Overview-Model”, fig 18, for a view of the interaction between service registration and service discovery. Unfortunately the referred document fails to recognize the need for per-identity service registrations, unless the oblique reference, where no difference is made between service requester entity and the data subject, in section 5.4.4 “Service Discovery”, counts.

2.6 Realization of the Trust and Privacy Negotiator Function

The protocol to realise the trust negotiation functionality has yet to be finalised. Candidate protocols are:

i. the one used by TrustBuilder 2 [TrustBuilder2]
ii. one based on the Web Service Profile of XACML [Anderson07] as enhanced by [Mbanaso09]
iii. one based on an enhanced Liberty Discovery Service [Disco2]

Whichever protocol is finally chosen it must be able to support a ceremony to gaining incremental levels of mutual trust. The Web GUI of the Front End MUST support the ceremony.

Trust and Policy Negotiation generally takes authentication and identification of all parties for granted, but then computes a trust score which typically governs the access control decisions.
2.6.1 Discovery in Trust and Privacy Negotiation

In this model both "Trust and Privacy Negotiator" and "ID Mapper" are implemented as parts of Discovery Service.

2.6.2 Frontend Trust and Privacy Negotiation

In future work we will address user giving input to Trust and Privacy Negotiation.

2.7 Realization of the Audit and Dashboard Function

2.7.1 Audit Event Bus

Tentative protocol choice (in order of preference):

1. AMQP [AMQP06]
2. Liberty Accounting Service [AcctSvc] with subscriptions and notifications [SUBS2] and [DesignPat].
3. Diameter [RFC3588]
4. RADIUS [RFC2138]
5. Apache Muse
Whichever transport is chosen, the actual audit records are packaged as OpenXDAS messages (see: openxdas.sourceforge.net).

### 2.7.2 Audit Event Ontology

- Enumeration of mandatory edit events according to some standard
  - RADIUS and Diameter communities have defined at least some messages
- ZXID logging documentation [ZXIDREADME] provides an idea, at least applicable to SSO

### 2.7.3 Dashboard Function

- Dashboard should also realize the "PII Consent Service" or "Privacy Manager" at large.
- SHOULD support Liberty Interaction service [Interact2]

### 2.8 Realization of Delegation Function

The Delegation Service functionality is described in section 6 of D7.1. The protocols that this will use will be described in the next version of the current deliverable.

### 2.9 Attribute Authorities

TAS³ network may contain various attribute authorities. Every Identity Provider may act as an attribute authority by including `<AttributeStatement>`, see [SAML2core], in the single sign-on assertions that it emits. This constitutes an attribute push mechanism.

Problem with a push mechanism is knowing which attributes to push. A possible solution is for the Front End to express its attribute needs using a SAML extension, such as [Kellomaki08]. However, usually a
better solution is to implement pull model Attribute Authority, i.e. the attribute authority is simply a web service.

There are several ways of implementing a data web service. [SAML2prof] specifies AttributeQuery protocol, but does not adequately specify the transport binding and peer authentication. TAS³ attribute authority SHOULD support [SAML2prof] AttributeQuery protocol using TAS³ SOAP binding, see section 2.2.2.

Other data web services, such as ID-DAP [IDDAP] over TAS³ SOAP binding, MAY be supported. A deployment may also make local or proprietary arrangements for accessing a non TAS³ attribute authority, e.g. using LDAP [RFC2251] or WebDAV with file containing attribute certificate or SAML attribute assertion.

2.10 TAS³ Simple Obligations Language (SOL)

TAS³ Architecture foresees that a Service Requester needs to express obligations and policies that it is willing and able to respect, and on the other hand the personal data will have associated with it obligations and policies ("sticky policies") under which the data can be released.

In general the obligations and sticky policies can be expressed in any convenient language. Unfortunately no standard language has emerged in the industry for this type of application despite many being proposed. TAS³ is committed to supporting multiple such languages, but for purposes of pilots and other simple applications we define "TAS³ Simple Obligations Language n°1" (SOL1) with potential future versions to follow.

SOL obligations MAY be used in XACML obligations as described in [TAS3D71IdMANAz]. In particular, D7.1 Appendix A1.2 provides an example. In short, they MUST appear in an <Obligation/AttributeAssignment element. When passed in <b:UsageDirective>, <xa:Obligation> element MUST be used as a wrapper. Use of <xa:Obligation> element as a wrapper in other XML contexts is RECOMMENDED.

The urn:tas3:sol:vers Query String parameter allow for versioning of the obligations language. The actual obligations are expressed using URL Query String Syntax with attribute value pairs expressing the obligations. Newline (0x0a) MAY be used as separator instead of an ampersand. Should escaping be needed, the URL encoding MAY be used.

Example

```
<x:a:Obligation ObligationID="http://TAS3.eu/TAS3sol/PrivacyPurpose"
                   FulfillOn="Permit">
   <xa:AttributeAssignment
      AttributeID="urn:tas3:attribute:obligationDescription"
      DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
      urn:tas3:sol:vers=1
      urn:tas3:sol:delon=1255555377
      urn:tas3:sol:share=urn:tas3:sol:share:group
   </xa:AttributeAssignment>
</xa:Obligation>
```

As can be seen from the example, the attributes are actually URNs and each attribute tends to express an obligation that is required by data or that the Requester promises to honour.

2.10.1 SOL1 Query String Attributes

- `urn:tas3:sol:vers` Identifies the version of SOL. Always "1" for SOL1.
- `urn:tas3:sol:use` How information can or will be used and shared. A comma separated list of enumerators in the order of principally intended use (ordered here, in our opinion, from least aggressive to more aggressive as indicated; however this ordering is subjective and other opinions may
exist). The urn:tas3:sol1:use:purpose should be favoured over urn:tas3:sol1:use, unless the vague meaning of urn:tas3:sol1:use is desired.

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:transaction** (0) Information will only be used for the transaction for which it was collected

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:session** (1) Information will only be used within the current session

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:user** (2) Information can be used in the user’s other sessions in the same app

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:forpurpose** (3) Information will be used only for the purpose it was collected, in abstract. This usage is discouraged. Instead the specific purpose should be specified using format

\[
\text{urn:tas3:sol1:use:purpose=business-process-model-id; or}
\]
\[
\text{urn:tas3:sol1:use:purpose=business-process-instance-id}
\]

These two forms allow the obligation to be tied into the model in abstract, or to the specific business process instance in particular, e.g. for exceptional processing such as Break-the-Glass.

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:serveranon** (4) Information can be used by other processes on same server as long as user is not explicitly identified

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:serverident** (5) Information can be used by other processes on same server (user may be identified)

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:appanon** (6) Information can be used by the application towards other purposes as long as the user is not explicitly identified

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:appident** (7) Information can be used by the application towards other purposes (user may be identified)

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:organon** (8) Information can be used by the organization for other nonmarketing purposes as long as the user is not explicitly identified

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:orgident** (9) Information can be used by the organization for other nonmarketing purposes (user may be identified)

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:mktanon** (10) Information can be used by the organization for marketing purposes as long as the user is not explicitly identified

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:mktident** (11) Information can be used by the organization for marketing purposes (user may be identified)

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:grpanon** (12) Information can be used within the business group for other nonmarketing purposes as long as the user is not explicitly identified

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:grpident** (13) Information can be used within the business group for other nonmarketing purposes (user may be identified)

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:grpmktanon** (14) Information can be used within the business group for marketing purposes as long as user is not explicitly identified

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:grpmktident** (15) Information can be used within the business group for marketing purposes (user may be identified)

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:shareanon** (16) Information can be shared with anyone for other nonmarketing purposes as long as the user is not explicitly identified

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:shareident** (17) Information can be shared with anyone for other nonmarketing purposes (user may be identified)

**urn:tas3:sol1:use:sharemktanon** (18) Information can be shared with anyone for marketing purposes as long as user is not explicitly identified
Information can be shared with anyone for marketing purposes (user may be identified)

Information can be used for any and all purposes without restriction.

Specific business process that is allowed to use the data. This can be specified either as abstract business-process-model-id or as business-process-instance-id. For example:

- urn:tas3:soll:use:purpose=麈ntin-process-model-id; or
- urn:tas3:soll:use:purpose=麈ntin-process-instance-id

These two forms allow the obligation to be tied into the model in abstract, or to the specific business process instance in particular, e.g. for exceptional processing such as Break-the-Glass.

Delete data on as Unix seconds since epoch. This obligation effectively allows control of data retention, but instead of being expressed in relative terms, it is expressed in absolute terms that are legally easier to interpret.

Maximum data retention period as Unix seconds. This obligation is meant for database storage. Upon act of data access, retention should be converted to delon using current wall clock time.

Certify deletion by legally binding report to the audit bus.

Before each use of the data, user’s explicit consent - preauthorization - has to be obtained. Value specifies where to obtain preauthorization.

When about to use data, call back to the user for opportunity to modify the data, or deny it. Value specifies where to call back.

Report use to the audit bus. Comma separated list of enumerators:

- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:never No need to report use (seldom appears)
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:all Report any and all use
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:oper Report operational use, but not statistical or administrative use.
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat:immed Report use in near real time. for day need to be reported, if there was any use.
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat:daily No need to report individual use, but summary statistics for day need to be reported, if there was any use.
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat:weekly No need to report individual use, but summary statistics for week need to be reported, if there was any use.
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat:monthly No need to report individual use, but summary statistics for month need to be reported, if there was any use.
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat:quarterly No need to report individual use, but summary statistics for quarter (last 3 months) need to be reported, if there was any use.
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat:semestral No need to report individual use, but summary statistics for semester (last 6 months) need to be reported, if there was any use.
- urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat:yearly No need to report individual use, but summary statistics for year need to be reported, if there was any use.
If no urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat is specified, default is urn:tas3:soll:repouse:stat:immed.

If conflicting enumerators are specified, the most strict one applies.

**urn:tas3:soll:xborder** Enumerator describing what sort of cross border data sharing can occur:

- **urn:tas3:soll:xdom:eu** Only within EU common market.
- **urn:tas3:soll:xdom:safeharbour** Common market and safe harbour participants

**urn:tas3:soll:license** Use of information is subject to license specified in the value part. The value part should be either URL to online accessible license text, or it should be a URN pointing to a well known license.

The general assumption is that the license terms are either well known to the system (and programmed in) or machine readable. While the user may have to consent to the license at some level, it is not meant that this license reference be displayed to user and he required to read and consent on the spot.

**urn:tas3:soll:contract-fwk** Framework or governance contract identifier.

**urn:tas3:soll:contract** Contract identifier.

**urn:tas3:soll:contract-sub** Subcontract or amendment identifier

**urn:tas3:soll:contract-part** Part, exhibit, annex, or clause identifier.

### 2.10.2 Matching Pledges to Sticky Policies and Obligations

When delivering response to data request, the Responder outbound PEP compares the pledges that were received in the request and checks that the sticky policies and obligations that are attached to the data coming from the backend repository can be satisfied given the pledges. This ensures that the Responder will never ship out data unless the Requester has clearly committed itself to respect the sticky policies and obligations.

**Example**

Consider the following request

```xml
<e:Envelope>
  <e:Header>
    <!-- WS-Addressing headers and wsse:Security with DSIG not shown -->
    <b:UsageDirective id="USE">
      <xa:Obligation ObligationID="http://TAS3.eu/TAS3sol/PrivacyPurpose"
      FulfillOn="Permit">
        <xa:AttributeAssignment
          AttributeID="urn:tas3:attribute:obligationDescription"
          DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
          urn:tas3:soll:vers=1
          urn:tas3:soll:delon=125555377
          urn:tas3:soll:use=urn:tas3:soll:use:purpose
          urn:tas3:soll:share=urn:tas3:soll:share:group
          urn:tas3:soll:repouse=urn:tas3:soll:repouse:oper
        </xa:AttributeAssignment>
    </xa:Obligation>
  </b:UsageDirective>
</e:Header>
<e:Body id="BDY">
  <idhrxml:Query>...</></idhrxml:Query>
</e:Body>
</e:Envelope>
```
Now, backend returns the following data:

```xml
<dataItem id="1">
    <tas3sol:Obligations xmlns:tas3sol="http://tas3.eu/tas3sol/200911/">
        urn:tas3:sol:vers=1
        urn:tas3:sol:delon=1255555378
        urn:tas3:soll:use=urn:tas3:soll:use:transaction
    </tas3sol:Obligations>
    <data>value</data>
</dataItem>

<dataItem id="2">
    <tas3sol:Obligations xmlns:tas3sol="http://tas3.eu/tas3sol/200911/">
        urn:tas3:sol:vers=1
        urn:tas3:sol:delon=1255555376
        urn:tas3:soll:use=urn:tas3:soll:use:purpose
        urn:tas3:soll:repouse=urn:tas3:soll:repouse:all
    </tas3sol:Obligations>
    <data>value</data>
</dataItem>

<dataItem id="3">
    <tas3sol:Obligations xmlns:tas3sol="http://tas3.eu/tas3sol/200911/">
        urn:tas3:sol:vers=1
        urn:tas3:sol:delon=1255555378
        urn:tas3:soll:use=urn:tas3:soll:use:purpose
    </tas3sol:Obligations>
    <data>value</data>
</dataItem>
```

The first data item would have to be filtered out because its usage policy is "transaction" while requester pledged usage for intended "purpose". Intended purpose can span many transactions, therefore its broader that the allowed use. Note that the delon constraint would be compatible with the request.

The second data item has to be filtered out for two reasons: (i) its delon is stricter than what requester pledged, and (ii) the repouse constraint is more onerous than requester is willing to perform.

The third data item’s obligations are compatible with the requester’s pledges. It is returned to the requester.

N.B. This is just an example. The way in which the obligations are attached to the data can be quite different from the illustrated, e.g. internal C data structure rather than XML. It is also possible that obligations are not stored with the data, but rather generated by a PDP based on data dependent sticky-policies.

Once the Responder Outbound PEP has filtered the data, it is sent, with the obligations, to Requester which MAY pass the obligations to Obligations Service for enforcement.

### 2.10.3 Passing Simple Obligations Dictionaries Around

While in SOL1 the set of enumerators is fixed and with fixed meaning which ishardwired to the simplest PEP implementations, we foresee users inventing additional attributes and enumerators. This raises the need for the PEP implementations to be configurable or somehow understand the new enumerators on basis of their semantics.
Such configurations and online semantics passing can be achieved with Simple Obligations Dictionaries (SODs), which effectively allow the semantics to be declared. The dictionary can be stored in a configuration file, and we provide SOL1 standard dictionary as sol1.sod (which you should not modify) and you may be able to provide additional dictionary fragments in user editable configuration files. Alternatively, the nonstandard dictionary fragments can be passed inline in the protocol by means of <tas3sol:dict> element.

Example

```xml
<e:Envelope>
  <e:Header>
    <!-- WS-Addressing headers and wsse:Security with DSIG not shown -->
    <b:UsageDirective id="USE">
      <xa:Obligation ObligationID="http://TAS3.eu/TAS3sol/PrivacyPurpose" FulfillOn="Permit">
        <xa:AttributeAssignment
            AttributeID="urn:tas3:attribute:obligationDescription"
            DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
          urn:tas3:sol:vers=1
          urn:tas3:sol1:delon=1255555377
          urn:tas3:sol1:use=urn:tas3:sol1:use:purpose
          urn:tas3:sol1:share=urn:tas3:sol1:share:group
          urn:tas3:sol1:repouse=urn:tas3:sol1:repouse:oper
        </>
      </xa:AttributeAssignment>
    </b:UsageDirective>
  </e:Header>
  <tas3sol:Dict xmlns:tas3sol="http://tas3.eu/tas3sol/200911/">
    Entities:
    - Data Subject (Agent the Data describes)
    - Data Processor (Agent that processes the Data)
    - Data (Information which is a resource under protection)
    - Organisation (a Data Processor)
    - Marketing (an Action)
    - Process (an Action of manipulating Data)
    - Relations:
      - Identify
      - Retain
      - Property
      - May (property of an action)
      - Must (property of an action)
      - urn:tas3:sol1:use:mktident is an enumerator of urn:tas3:sol1:use
      - urn:tas3:sol1:use:mktident means
        Organization (who) - Process (action) - Data (what) - Marketing (why)
        Organization (who) - Identify (action) - Data Subject (What)
  </tas3sol:Dict>
</e:Envelope>
```

This example uses <tas3sol:dict> element to define a new enumerator for urn:tas3:sol1:use
by spelling out its semantic meaning in terms of the dictionary items (example is somewhat unrealistic because you should not repeat or redefine dictionary entries from the standard sol1.sod). In particular the mktident really is a combination of two consequences: you will receive spam and you will be identified. Thus the "means" declaration has two lines.

### 2.11 Realization of Sticky Policies

As discussed in [TAS3ARCH] section 4.1 "Protocol Support for Conveyance of Sticky Policies", Encapsulating Security Layer (ESL) is one approach for implementing sticky policies. For implementing this approach, we recommend using a special SOAP header that specifies the sticky policies and references the data objects to which they apply. The reference is either by XML id attribute (preferred) or a simplified absolute XPath [XPATH99].

**Example**

```xml
<e:Envelope>
  <e:Header>
    <wsse:Security>...</>
    <tas3:ESLPolicies mustUnderstand="1">
      <tas3:ESLApply>
        <tas3:ESLRef ref="#data1"/>
        <tas3:ESLRef xpath="container/subcontainer"/>
        <xa:Obligation ObligationID="http://TAS3.eu/TAS3sol/PrivacyPurpose">
          <xa:AttributeAssignment
            AttributeID="urn:tas3:attribute:obligationDescription"
            DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
            urn:tas3:sol:vers=1
            urn:tas3:sol1:delon=1255555377
          </xa:AttributeAssignment>
        </xa:Obligation>
      </tas3:ESLApply>
      <tas3:ESLApply>
        <tas3:ESLRef ref="#data2"/>
        <xa:Obligation ObligationID="http://TAS3.eu/TAS3sol/PrivacyPurpose">
          <xa:AttributeAssignment
            AttributeID="urn:tas3:attribute:obligationDescription"
            DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
            urn:tas3:sol:vers=1
            urn:tas3:sol1:delon=1255566666
          </xa:AttributeAssignment>
        </xa:Obligation>
      </tas3:ESLApply>
    </tas3:ESLPolicies>
  </e:Header>
  <e:Body>
    <data id="data1" value="foo">
      <data id="data2" value="bar">
        <container>
          <subdata value="goo"/>
        </container>
      </data>
    </data>
  </e:Body>
</e:Envelope>
```

In the above example both id based references to <data> and XPath based reference for the <subdata> are illustrated. It also illustrates how to apply different sticky policies (n.b. Obligation is a particularly
common type of sticky policy) to different data.

### 2.12 Passing Additional Credentials in Web Service Call

The usual way to pass credentials is using an attribute assertion inside `<wsse:Security>` header. Such attribute assertion identifies the calling user. Sometimes additional credentials identifying the actual resource are passed in `<TargetIdentity>` SOAP header. However, both of these methods basically admit single credential (which can contain other credentials as attributes) typically not signed by the Requester. If Requester needs to add additional credentials, it can use `<tas3:Credential>` element.

```xml
<e:Envelope>
  <e:Header>
    <wsse:Security>...</wsse:Security>
    <tas3:Credentials>
      ... reuse XACML or SAML attribute schema
    </tas3:Credentials>
  </e:Header>
  <e:Body>...</e:Body>
</e:Envelope>
```
3 The Official TAS³ API (normative, but non-exclusive)

Although wire-interoperability is the main goal of the TAS³ project, we recognize that interoperability at software interface level, i.e. interchangeable implementations of an API, is valuable as well. Standardization of APIs, in addition to wire protocols, helps to promote building a culture and community of programmers catering for the TAS³ platform. Such community fosters adoption through mutual self help and shared knowledge base. Supporting full constellation of APIs for all programming languages and platforms is fairly expensive business, but is necessary to address the present fragmented market.

The TAS³ API described herein is meant to have multiple implementations. Each implementation provides

- The interface files described herein, such as tas3.h
- Libraries or implementation files that provide the symbols described by the interface files. In as far as possible, these will be called libtas3.so, libtas3.dll, or other appropriate and similar name. However a concrete implementation may choose to incorporate the TAS³ API interface in its own library, or may require its own library to be included in addition to the libtas3.* library. Such additional requirements shall be conspicuously described in the implementation documentation.

The official TAS³ API is not meant to exclude other wire-protocol compatible implementations of TAS³. Thus, while there is only one official API, other APIs can be equally TAS³ compatible on the wire.

The particular API in use is chosen by the programmer by including the appropriate header file or interface description. The particular API implementation in use is chosen by the system administrator or the programmer by linking against a particular library providing the TAS³ binary interface, or by dynamically loading a module implementing the said binary interface. This leaves great implementation flexibility while accurately describing the TAS³ interface and implementation at source code (API) and binary (ABI) level.

3.1 Language Independent Description of the API

Since all language specific bindings, by-and-large, share the same semantics, the functions and methods are first described generically, using pseudocode if needed. Each language binding takes same parameters and behaves in the way that API would naturally work, mutatis mutandis, for that language.¹

The five essential APIs are

- **tas3_sso()**  SSO (with optional application independent authorization)
- **tas3_az()**  Application Dependent Authorization
- **tas3_call()**  Web Services Client: call a web service and validate response
- **tas3_wsp_validate()**  Validate that web service request can be processed
- **tas3_wsp_decorate()**  Create a web service response

3.1.1 Single Sign On (SSO) Alternatives

The TAS³ SSO API’s primary aim is supporting SAML 2.0 SSO (and SLO) with attribute and bootstrap passing. Not all COTS SAML 2.0 SP APIs (or IdPs) are capable of this out of the box. Thus being SAML 2.0 compatible is a prerequisite, but additional properties, such as specific functions, session level attribute pool, and bootstrap cache, must be satisfied as well to be TAS³ API compliant. The TAS³ SSO API is likely to support in future (as of 2009) in a transparent way InfoCard specification [CardSpace], and may be able to support other SSO specifications as well.

¹Some procedural bias is evident, even in “object oriented” language bindings. This is due to least-common-denominator syndrome, i.e. desire to have same API for all programming languages.
Some alternatives for supporting SSO:

- **mod_auth_saml** and (Apache) subprocess environment provides a complete solution for SSO layer if using Apache httpd or compatible web server. In such case the SSO is handled without any programming simply by editing `httpd.conf` (and in some cases `zxid.conf`). The `mod_auth_saml` configuration directives are the same as in `zxid.org` and they are introduced to `httpd.conf` using `ZXIDConf` directives.

- **tas3_sso()** API as complete solution. **tas3_sso()** API implements a state machine that the calling application must crank by making repeated calls (one per HTTP request until SSO completes). This approach has a benefit of isolating the calling application from protocol flow specifics and allows the API to support multiple SSO protocols in a transparent manner.

- **tas3_sso_servlet.class:** Java servlet that can be configured to Tomcat or other servlet container to implement SSO for payload servlets. Internally the SSO servlet calls `tas3_simple();`

- Deprecated Alternative: by steps approach using medium level APIs (deprecated because the logic of the specific SSO protocol flow would be hardwired into the calling application)

### 3.1.2 SSO: ret = **tas3_sso(conf, qs, auto_flags)**

The **tas3_sso()** API is essentially a Single Sign-On protocol state machine. Unless the application already has a valid active session established, it should call **tas3_sso()** upon every HTTP request, passing in the query string or form submission part as the `qs` argument. The argument is a string and must be formatted as a query string. The **tas3_sso()** then returns a string which the calling application needs to interpret to decide what to do next. Possible actions include performing HTTP redirect, sending the returned string as HTTP response, or completing a successful single sign on.

When Single Sign-On is completed, the **tas3_sso()** establishes a session object for holding received attributes and bootstrap EPRs. These can be accessed from the session either by the calling application, or by other **TAS3** API functions such as **tas3_az()** and **tas3_call()**. The **tas3_sso()** may incorporate a configurable frontend policy enforcement point. Such configuration is implementation dependent.

There are many options. Most of these have sensible default values or can be specified in a configuration file. The first parameter either is a configuration object, or a configuration string that modifies or adds to the default configuration. Some aspects of operation of **tas3_sso()** are affected by the `auto_flags` parameter.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PATH</strong></td>
<td>Path of configuration directory, which contains the configuration file and may contain other implementation dependent information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URL</strong></td>
<td>Base URL from which the EntityID is formed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2: \texttt{tas3\_sso()} AUTO flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_EXIT</td>
<td>Call \texttt{exit(2)}, 0=return &quot;n&quot;, even if auto CGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_REDIR</td>
<td>Automatic: handle redirects, assume CGI (calls \texttt{exit(2)})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_SOAPC</td>
<td>SOAP response handling, content gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_SOAPH</td>
<td>SOAP response handling, header gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_METAC</td>
<td>Metadata response handling, content gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_METAH</td>
<td>Metadata response handling, header gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>0x40</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_LOGINC</td>
<td>IdP select / Login page handling, content gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>0x80</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_LOGINH</td>
<td>IdP select / Login page handling, header gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>0x100</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_MGMTC</td>
<td>Management page handling, content gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512</td>
<td>0x200</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_MGMTH</td>
<td>Management page handling, header gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1024</td>
<td>0x400</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_FORMF</td>
<td>In idp list and mgmt screen, generate form fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2048</td>
<td>0x800</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_FORMT</td>
<td>In idp list &amp; mgmt screen, wrap in \texttt{&lt;form&gt;} tag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4095</td>
<td>0xfff</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_ALL</td>
<td>Enable all automatic CGI behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4096</td>
<td>0x1000</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_DEBUG</td>
<td>Enable debugging output to stderr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8192</td>
<td>0x2000</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_OFMTQ</td>
<td>Output Format Query String</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16384</td>
<td>0x4000</td>
<td>TAS3_AUTO_OFMTJ</td>
<td>Output Format JSON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Example Usage**

```
01 res = tas3_sso(conf, request["QUERY\_STRING"], 0x1800);
02 switch (substr(res, 0, 1)) {
03  case 'L': header(res); return 0; # Redirect
04  case 'n': return 0; # already handled
05  case 'b': return my_send_metadata();
06  case 'e': return my_render_idp_selection_screen();
07  case 'd': return my_start_session_and_render_protected_content();
08  default: error_log("Unknown tas3_sso() res(\%s)", res); return 0;
09 }
```

**Return values**

The return value starts by an action letter and may be followed by data that is relevant for the action.

L  Redirection request (L as in Location header). The full contents of the res is the redirection request, ready to be printed to stdout of a CGI. If you want to handle the redirection some other way, you can parse the string to extract the URL and do your thing. This res is only returned if you did not set TAS3\_AUTO\_REDIR.

Example:

```
Location: https://sp1.zxidsp.org:8443/zxid?o=C
```

C  Content with Content-type header. The res is ready to be printed to the stdout of a CGI, but if you want to handle it some other way, you can parse the res to extract the header and the actual body.

Example:

```
CONTENT-TYPE: text/html
<title>Login page</title>
...
```
Example (metadata):

```
CONTENT-TYPE: text/xml

<m:EntityDescriptor>
  ...
</m:EntityDescriptor>
```

**Less than ("<")** Content without headers. This could be HTML content for login page or metadata XML. To know which (and set content type correctly), you would have to parse the content. This res format is only applicable if you did not specify TAS3_AUTO_CTYPE (but did specify TAS3_AUTO_CONTENT).

n Do nothing. The operation was somehow handled internally but the exit(2) was not called (e.g. TAS3_AUTO_SOAP was NOT specified). The application should NOT attempt generating any output.

b Indication that the application should send SP metadata to the client. This res is only returned if you did not set TAS3_AUTO_META.

c Indication that the application should send SP CARML declaration to the client. This res is only returned if you did not set TAS3_AUTO_META.

e Indication that the application should display the idp selection page. This res is only returned if you did not set TAS3_AUTO_CONTENT.

d Indication that SSO has been completed or that there was an existing valid session in place. The res is an LDIF entry containing attributes that describe the SSO or session.

```
dn: idpnid=Pa45XAs2332SDS2asFs,affid=https://idp.demo.com/idp.xml
objectclass: zxidsession
affid: https://idp.demo.com/idp.xml
idpnid: Pa45XAs2332SDS2asFs
authnctxlevel: password
sesid: S12aF3Xi4A
cn: Joe Doe
```

Usually your application would parse the attributes and then render its application specific content.

z Authorization failure. Application MUST NOT display protected content. Instead, it should offer user interface where the user can understand what happened and possibly gain the extra credentials needed.

**Asterisk ("*")** Although any unknown letter should be interpreted as an error, we follow convention of prefixing errors with an asterisk ("*").

### 3.1.3 Authorization: decision = \texttt{tas3\_az(conf, qs, ses)}

Implicit application independent authorization steps are performed in \texttt{tas3\_sso()} SSO, \texttt{tas3\_call()} Service Requester, \texttt{tas3\_wsp\_validate()} and \texttt{tas3\_wsp\_decorate()} APIs. To activate them, you need to supply appropriate configuration options. Specifics of this configuration are implementation dependent.

The \texttt{tas3\_az()} function is the main work horse for requesting authorization decisions from the PDPs. It allows programmer to make Application Dependent authorization calls, supplying some or all of the attributes needed in a XACML request. \texttt{tas3\_az()} can also use attributes from the session, if configured. Specifics of this configuration are implementation dependent.

\texttt{conf} the configuration string or object
qs  if supplied, any CGI variables are imported to session environment as attributes according to configuration. Format is CGI Query String.

ses attributes are obtained from the session, if supplied (see also CGI). Session ID can be supplied as a string or a session object can be passed.

return 0 if deny (for any reason, e.g. indeterminate), or string if permit

Example Pseudocode

```c
    cf = tas3_new_conf();
    ses = tas3_alloc_ses(cf);
    ret = tas3_simple Cf ses(cf, 0, $QUERY_STRING, ses, 0, 0x1800);
    if (ret =~ /^d/) {
        perr "SSO ok, now checking authorization";
        if (tas3_az Cf ses(cf, "Action=SHOW&BusinessProcess=register:emp", ses))
            perr "Permit, add code to deliver application content";
        else
            perr "Deny, send back an error";
    }
```

3.1.4 Web Service Call:  ret_soap = tas3_call(cf, ses, svctype, url, di_opt, az_cred, req_soap)

tas3_call() first checks if req_soap string is already a SOAP envelope. If not it will supply missing `<Envelope>` and `<Body>` elements. The idea is that the programmer can concentrate on application layer and the tas3_call() will supply the rest automatically. If, however, the programmer wishes to pass some SOAP headers, he can do so by passing the entire envelope. Even if entire envelope is passed, tas3_call() will add TAS3 specific headers and signatures to this envelope.

Similarly on return, tas3_call() will check all TAS3 relevant SOAP headers and signatures, but will still return the entire SOAP envelope as a string so that the application layer can, if it wants, look at the headers.

Next, tas3_call() will attempt to locate an EPR for the service type. This may already be in the session cache, or a discovery step may be performed. If discovery is needed it will be automatically made. The discovery can be constrained using url and di_opt parameters. For example, if there is a predetermined (list of) service provider(s), the url parameter can be used to force the choice. Discovery may still be done to obtain credentials needed for the call, but the discovery result will be constrained to match the supplied url. See section tas3_get_epr() for description of explicit discovery.

Before actual SOAP call, tas3_call() may contact a PDP to authorize the outbound call. This corresponds to application independent Requester Out PEP and is configurable: you can disable it if you prefer to make an explicit application dependent call to tas3_az(). The attributes for the XACML request are mainly derived from the session, but additional attributes can be supplied with az_cred parameter, which has query string format. Functioning of the authorization step can be controlled using configuration, which is implementation dependent.

Then tas3_call() augments the XML data structure with Liberty ID-WSF mandated headers. It will look at the security mechanism and token specified in the EPR and perform appropriate steps to create WS-Security header and apply signature as needed.

After executing the SOAP call and verifying any returned TAS3 relevant headers and signatures, tas3_call() may contact a PDP to authorize receiving data, and to pass on any obligations that were received. This corresponds to application independent Requester In PEP and is configurable: you can disable it if you prefer to make explicit application dependent call to tas3_az(). The contents of the XACML request are determined based on the response, session, az_cred parameter, which is shared for both Responder Out and Responder In PDP calls, and configuration, which is implementation dependent.
cf  Configuration object, see `tas3_new_conf_to_cf()`

ses  Session object, used to locate EPRs, see `tas3_new_ses()`

type  Service type and namespace URN that is applicable to the body. Passed as a string.

url  (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL.

di_opt  (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format

az_cred  (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format. These credentials will be populated to the session’s attribute pool in addition to the ones obtained from SSO and other sources. Then a PDP is called to get an authorization decision (as well as obligations we pledge to support). This implements generalized (application independent) Requester Out and Requester In PEPs. To implement application dependent PEP features you should call `tas3_az()` directly.

reqSoap  string used as SOAP body or as SOAP envelope template.

return  SOAP envelope as a string.

Example

01 env = tas3_callf(cf, ses, 0,0,0, "urn:hrxml:idhrxml",
02 "<idhrxml:Modify>
03 "<idhrxml:ModifyItem>
04 "<idhrxml:Select>%s</idhrxml:Select>
05 "<idhrxml:NewData>%s</idhrxml:NewData>
06 "</idhrxml:ModifyItem>
07 ":</idhrxml:Modify>", cgi.select, cgi.data);

As can be seen, the paradigm is to supply the payload data as a string. Although it could be supplied as a data structure, constructed with many constructors, our experience has shown that string representation is most intuitive and self documenting for most programmers. Despite abandoning the constructor approach, all relevant syntax and schema checks are internally done by simply parsing the string and then reserializing it before sending to the wire. This tends to be necessary anyway due to signature generation.

3.1.5 Responder in: `tgtnid = tas3_wsp_validate(cf, ses, az_cred, soap_req)`

Validate SOAP request (envelope), specified by the string `soap_req`. Service Responder should call this function to validate an inbound, received, TAS3 request. This will

• verify signatures
• determine trust
• populate to WSP’s session any credentials found in the request
• possibly perform an application independent `Responder In PEP` authorization, calling a PDP behind the scenes using `tas3_az()`.

After `tas3_wsp_validate()`, the application needs to, in application dependent way, extract from the response the application payload and process it. However, this is much simplified as there is no need to perform any further verification.

If the string `soap_req` starts by "<e:Envelope", then it should be a complete SOAP envelope including `<e:Header> (and `<e:Body> parts. 
cf  TAS\(^3\) configuration object, see \textit{tas3\_new\_conf()}

\texttt{ses}  Session object that contains the EPR cache, see \textit{tas3\_new\_ses()}

\texttt{az\_cred}  (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format. These credentials will be populated to the attribute pool in addition to the ones obtained from token and other sources. Then a PDP is called to get an authorization decision (matching obligations we support to those in the request, and obligations pledged by caller to those we insist on). This implements generalized (application independent) \textit{Responder In PEP}. To implement application dependent PEP features you should call \textit{tas3\_az()} directly.

\texttt{soap\_req}  Entire SOAP envelope as a string

\texttt{return}  idpnid, as a string, of the target identity of the request (rest of the information is populated to the session object, from where it can be retrieved).

\texttt{3.1.6 Responder out: soap = tas3\_wsp\_decorate(cf, ses, az\_cred, soap\_resp)}

Add ID-WSF (and TAS3) specific headers and signatures to web service response. Simple and intuitive specification of XML as string: no need to build complex data structures.

Service responder should prepare application layer of the response and then call this function to decorate the response with TAS3 specifics, and to wrap it in SOAP envelope. This will

- add correlation headers
- possibly perform an application independent \textit{Responder Out PEP} authorization step, calling a PDP behind the scenes using \textit{tas3\_az()}.
- apply signature

If the string starts by "\texttt{<e:Envelope\>}" then string should be a complete SOAP envelope including \texttt{<e:Header>} and \texttt{<e:Body>} parts. This allows caller to specify custom SOAP headers, in addition to the ones that the underlying \textit{zxid\_wsc\_call()} will add. Usually the payload service will be passed as the contents of the body. If the string starts by "\texttt{<e:Body\>}" then the \texttt{<e:Envelope>} and \texttt{<e:Header>} are automatically added. If the string starts by neither of the above (be careful to use the "\texttt{e:}\" as namespace prefix), the it is assumed to be the payload content of the \texttt{<e:Body>} and the rest of the SOAP envelope is added.

cf  TAS\(^3\) configuration object, see \textit{tas3\_new\_conf()}

\texttt{ses}  Session object that contains the EPR cache

\texttt{az\_cred}  (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format. These credentials will be populated to the attribute pool in addition to the ones obtained from token and other sources. Then a PDP is called to get an authorization decision (generating obligations). This implements generalized (application independent) \textit{Responder Out PEP}. To implement application dependent PEP features you should call \textit{tas3\_az()} directly.

\texttt{soap\_resp}  XML payload as a string

\texttt{return}  SOAP Envelope of the response, as a string, ready to be sent as HTTP response.
### 3.1.7 Explicit Discovery: epr = \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr(cf, ses, svc, url, di\_opt, act, n)}

N.B. This function is automatically called by \texttt{tas3\_call()} so making an explicit call is seldom needed. You may consider making such call if you need to know which EPR is actually found and you want to query some properties of the EPR. You can then pass the URL, as found using \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr\_url()}, as an argument to \texttt{tas3\_call()} to constrain the call to use a specific EPR.

First search epr cache, and if miss, go discover an EPR over the net. This is the main work horse for WSCs wishing to call WSPs via EPR.

- \texttt{cf} TAS$^3$ configuration object, also used for memory allocation
- \texttt{ses} Session object in whose EPR cache the file will be searched
- \texttt{svc} Service type (usually a URN). String.
- \texttt{url} (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL. String.
- \texttt{di\_opt} (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format.
- \texttt{act} (Optional) The action, or method, that must be invokable on the service. String.
- \texttt{n} How manieth matching instance is returned. 1 means first. Integer.

Return EPR data structure on success, null on failure (no discovery EPR in cache, or not found by the discovery service).

### 3.1.8 url = \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr\_url(cf, epr)}

Returns the \texttt{<a:Address>} field of an EPR as a string. This is the endpoint URL.

### 3.1.9 entityid = \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr\_entid(cf, epr)}

Returns the \texttt{<di:ProviderID>} field of an EPR as a string. This is same as SAML2 EntityID.

### 3.1.10 a7n = \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr\_a7n(cf, epr)}

Returns assertion from EPR \texttt{<sec:Token>} field as a string.
3.2 Java Binding

Before you start using the SSO API, you should consider using the TAS³ SSO servlet. `tas3_sso_servlet.class` can be configured to Tomcat or other servlet container to implement SSO for payload servlets. Internally the SSO servlet calls `tas3_sso()`.

Similar module is planned (as of 2009) for Responder implementation. The pushable filter module for servlet environments (e.g. Tomcat) will wrap `tas3.wsp_validate()` and `tas3.wsp_decorate()`. The filter module allows some web services to be TAS³ enabled without modification to the application code.

3.2.1 Interface and Initialization

This binding is implemented as `tas3java.class` and `libtas3jni.so` (`libtas3jni.jnilib` on MacOS X, `libtas3jni.dll` on Windows) module.

Typically you need to include in your Java servlet or program something like

```java
import tas3java.*;
static tas3.tas3_conf cf;
static {
    System.loadLibrary("tas3jni");
    cf = tas3.new_conf_to_cf("/var/tas3/");
}
```

This will bring in the functionality of the TAS³ Java binding and cause the JNI library implementing this functionality to be loaded. It will also create a configuration object that the other parts of a servlet can share.

The Java binding replaces the "tas3_" prefix in function names with the class prefix "tas3.", for example `tas3_sso()` becomes `tas3.sso()` and `tas3_az()` becomes `tas3.az()`.

The TAS³ Java interface is defined as follows

```java
package tas3;

public interface tas3 {
    public static tas3_conf new_conf_to_cf(String conf);
    public static tas3_ses new_ses(tas3_conf cf);
    public static tas3_ses fetch_ses(tas3_conf cf, String sid);
    public static String sso_cf(tas3_conf cf, int qs_len, String qs,
                                 p_int res_len, int auto_flags);
    public static int get_ses(tas3_conf cf, tas3_ses ses, String sid);
    public static int az_cf_ses(tas3_conf cf, String qs, tas3_ses ses);
    public static int az(cf, String conf, String qs, String sid);
    public static String wsp_validate(tas3_conf cf, tas3_ses ses,
                                       String az_cred, String enve);
    public static String wsp_decorate(tas3_conf cf, tas3_ses ses,
                                       String az_cred, String enve);
    public static String call(tas3_conf cf, tas3_ses ses,
                               String svctype, String url, String di_opt,
                               String az_cred, String enve);
    public static String get_epr(tas3_conf cf, tas3_ses ses,
                                String svc, String url, String di_opt,
                                String action, int n);
    // Other methods...
}
```
public static String get_epr_url(tas3_conf cf, tas3_epr epr);
public static String get_epr_entid(tas3_conf cf, tas3_epr epr);
public static String get_epr_a7n(tas3_conf cf, tas3_epr epr);
}

3.2.2 Initialize: \texttt{cf = tas3.new\_conf\_to\_cf(conf)}

Create a new TAS3 configuration object given configuration string and possibly configuration file. Usually a configuration object is generated and passed around to different API calls to avoid reparsing the configuration at each API call.

\texttt{conf} Configuration string
\texttt{return} Configuration object

3.2.3 New session: \texttt{ses = tas3.new\_ses(cf)}

Create a new TAS3 session object. Usually a session object is created just before calling

\texttt{cf} Configuration object, see \texttt{tas3.new\_conf\_to\_cf()}
\texttt{return} Session object

3.2.4 SSO: \texttt{ret = tas3.sso\_cf\_ses(cf, qs\_len, qs, ses, null, auto\_flags)}

\texttt{cf} Configuration object, see \texttt{tas3.new\_conf\_to\_cf()}
\texttt{qs\_len} Length of the query string. -1 = use \texttt{strlen()}
\texttt{qs} Query string (or POST content)
\texttt{ses} Session object, see \texttt{tas3.new\_ses()}. Session object is modified.
\texttt{res\_len} Result parameter. Must always pass \texttt{null} as result parameters are not supported in the Java binding.
\texttt{auto\_flags} Automation flags
\texttt{return} String representing protocol action or SSO attributes

3.2.5 Authorization: \texttt{decision = tas3.az\_cf\_ses(cf, qs, ses)}

\texttt{cf} the configuration object, see \texttt{tas3.new\_conf\_to\_cf()}
\texttt{qs} additional attributes that are passed to PDP
\texttt{ses} session object, from which most attributes come
\texttt{return} 0 on deny (for any reason, e.g. indeterminate), or non-null if permit.
3.2.6 WSC: resp_soap = tas3.call(cf, ses, svctype, url, di_opt, az_cred, req_soap)

  cf  Configuration object, see tas3.new_conf_to_cf()
  ses  Session object, used to locate EPRs, see tas3.new_ses()
  svctype  Service type and namespace URN that is applicable to the body. Passed as a string.
  url  (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL.
  di_opt  (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format
  az_cred  (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.
  req_soap  string used as SOAP body or as SOAP envelope template.
  return  SOAP envelope as a string

3.2.7 WSP: tgtnid = tas3.wsp_validate(cf, ses, az_cred, soap_req)

  cf  TAS^3 configuration object, see tas3.new_conf_to_cf()
  ses  Session object that contains the EPR cache, see tas3.new_ses()
  az_cred  (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.
  soap_req  Entire SOAP envelope as a string
  return  idpnid, as a string, of the target identity of the request (rest of the information is populated to the session object, from where it can be retrieved).

3.2.8 WSP: soap = tas3.wsp_decorate(cf, ses, az_cred, soap_resp)

  cf  TAS^3 configuration object, see tas3.new_conf_to_cf()
  ses  Session object that contains the EPR cache
  az_cred  (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.
  soap_resp  XML payload, as a string
  return  SOAP Envelope of the response, as a string, ready to be sent as HTTP response.

3.2.9 Explicit Discovery: epr = tas3.get_epr(cf, ses, svc, url, di_opt, act, n)

First search epr cache, and if miss, go discover an EPR over the net. This is the main work horse for WSCs wishing to call WSPs via EPR.

  cf  TAS^3 configuration object, also used for memory allocation
  ses  Session object in whose EPR cache the file will be searched
  svc  Service type (usually a URN)
  url  (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL.
di_opt (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format

act (Optional) The action, or method, that must be invokable on the service

n How manieth matching instance is returned. 1 means first

return EPR data structure on success, 0 on failure (no discovery EPR in cache, or not found by the discovery service).

3.2.10 url = tas3.get_epr_url(cf, epr)

cf TAS\(^3\) configuration object, also used for memory allocation

epr An EPR object, such as obtained from \(\text{tas3\_get\_epr}\)()

return The \(<\text{a:Address}>\) field of an EPR as a string. This is the endpoint URL.

3.2.11 entityid = tas3.get_epr_entid(cf, epr)

cf TAS\(^3\) configuration object, also used for memory allocation

epr An EPR object, such as obtained from \(\text{tas3\_get\_epr}\)()

return The \(<\text{di:ProviderID}>\) field of an EPR as a string. This is same as SAML2 EntityID.

3.2.12 a7n = tas3.get_epr_a7n(cf, epr)

cf TAS\(^3\) configuration object, also used for memory allocation

epr An EPR object, such as obtained from \(\text{tas3\_get\_epr}\)()

return Assertion from EPR \(<\text{sec:Token}>\) field as a string.

3.2.13 Available Implementations (Non-normative)

This binding is implemented using Java Native Interface calls to \(\text{zxid.org C library by zxidjni module.}\)

Other implementations are welcome.
3.3 PHP Binding

Using TAS³ PHP APIs requires first loading the TAS³ module and creating a configuration object. These are typically accomplished from PHP initialization. You may consider creating `tas3.ini` file:

```php
dl("php_tas3.so");
$cf = tas3_new_conf_to_cf("PATH=/var/tas3/");
```

3.3.1 Application Level Integration

It should be noted that many PHP applications run inside Apache httpd and therefore can accomplish SSO using mod_auth_saml approach without any programming. Especially useful is mod_auth_saml’s ability to "fake" REMOTE_USER subprocess environment variable, effectively enabling any application that supports HTTP basic authentication to also support SAML SSO.

We expect to provide specific integration examples for some software packages. As of 2009 none are available, but Mahara is one of the first ones planned.

3.3.2 $cf = tas3_new_conf_to_cf($conf)

`conf` Configuration string

return Configuration object

3.3.3 $ses = tas3_new_ses($cf)

Create a new TAS3 session object. Usually a session object is created just before calling

`cf` Configuration object

return Session object

3.3.4 SSO: ret = tas3_sso_cf_ses($cf, -1, $qs, $ses, null, $auto_flags)

`cf` Configuration object, see `tas3_new_conf_to_cf()`

`qs_len` Length of the query string. -1 = use `strlen()`

`qs` Query string (or POST content)

`ses` Session object, see `tas3_new_ses()`. Session object is modified.

`res_len` Should always be passed as null (result parameter is not supported for PHP).

`auto_flags` Automation flags

return String representing protocol action or SSO attributes

Example

```php
01 <?
02 $qs = $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'GET'
03 ? $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING']
04 : file_get_contents('php://input');
05 $ses = tas3_new_ses($cf);
```
06 $res = tas3_sso_cf_ses($cf, -1, $qs, $ses, null, 0x1814);
07 switch (substr($res, 0, 1)) {
08 case 'L': header($res); exit;  # Redirect (Location header)
09 case '<': header('Content-type: text/xml'); echo $res; exit;
10 case 'n': exit;  # Already handled
11 case 'e': my_render_idp_select();
12 case 'd': break;  # Logged in case
13 default: die("Unknown res($res"));
14 }
15
16 if (tas3_az_cf_ses($cf, "Action=Show", $ses)) {
17 echo "Permit.\n";
18 # Render protected content here
19 } else {
20 echo "<b>Deny.</b>";
21 }
22 ?>

3.3.5 Authorization: decision = tas3_az_cf_ses(cf, qs, ses)

- **cf**: the configuration object
- **qs**: additional attributes that are passed to PDP
- **ses**: session object, from which most attributes come

3.3.6 WSC: resp_soap = tas3_call(cf, ses, svctype, url, di_opt, az_cred, req_soap)

- **cf**: Configuration object, see **tas3_new_conf_to_cf()**
- **ses**: Session object, used to locate EPRs, see **tas3_new_ses()**
- **svctype**: Service type and namespace URN that is applicable to the body. Passed as a string.
- **url**: (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL.
- **di_opt**: (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format
- **az_cred**: (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.
- **req_soap**: string used as SOAP body or as SOAP envelope template.

**return**: SOAP envelope as a string

Example

01 $ret = tas3_call($cf, $ses, "urn:id-sis-idhrxml:2007-06:dst-2.1",
02 null, null, null,
03 "<idhrxml:Query>",
04 "<idhrxml:QueryItem>",
05 "<idhrxml:Select>$criteria</idhrxml:Select>",
06 "</idhrxml:QueryItem>",
07 "</idhrxml:Query>");
3.3.7 WSP: \texttt{tgtnid = tas3\_wsp\_validate(cf, ses, az\_cred, soap\_req)}

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{cf} TAS\textsuperscript{3} configuration object, see \texttt{tas3\_new\_conf()}
\item \texttt{ses} Session object that contains the EPR cache, see \texttt{tas3\_new\_ses()}
\item \texttt{az\_cred} (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.
\item \texttt{soap\_req} Entire SOAP envelope as a string
\end{itemize}

\texttt{return} idpnid, as a string, of the target identity of the request (rest of the information is populated to the session object, from where it can be retrieved).

3.3.8 WSP: \texttt{soap = tas3\_wsp\_decorate(cf, ses, az\_cred, soap\_resp)}

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{cf} TAS\textsuperscript{3} configuration object, see \texttt{tas3\_new\_conf()}
\item \texttt{ses} Session object that contains the EPR cache
\item \texttt{az\_cred} (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.
\item \texttt{soap\_resp} XML payload, as a string
\end{itemize}

\texttt{return} SOAP Envelope of the response, as a string, ready to be sent as HTTP response.

3.3.9 Explicit Discovery: \texttt{epr = tas3\_get\_epr(cf, ses, svc, url, di\_opt, act, n)}

First search epr cache, and if miss, go discover an EPR over the net. This is the main work horse for WSCs wishing to call WSPs via EPR.

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{cf} TAS\textsuperscript{3} configuration object, also used for memory allocation
\item \texttt{ses} Session object in whose EPR cache the file will be searched
\item \texttt{svc} Service type (usually a URN)
\item \texttt{url} (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL.
\item \texttt{di\_opt} (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format
\item \texttt{act} (Optional) The action, or method, that must be invokable on the service
\item \texttt{n} How manieth matching instance is returned. 1 means first
\end{itemize}

\texttt{return} EPR data structure on success, 0 on failure (no discovery EPR in cache, or not found by the discovery service).

3.3.10 \texttt{url = tas3\_get\_epr\_url(cf, epr)}

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{cf} TAS\textsuperscript{3} configuration object, also used for memory allocation
\item \texttt{epr} An EPR object, such as obtained from \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr()}
\end{itemize}

\texttt{return} The \texttt{<a:Address>} field of an EPR as a string. This is the endpoint URL.
3.3.11  \texttt{entityid = tas3\_get\_epr\_entid(cf, epr)}

\texttt{cf}  TAS$^3$ configuration object, also used for memory allocation

\texttt{epr}  An EPR object, such as obtained from \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr()}

\texttt{return}  The \texttt{<di:ProviderID>} field of an EPR as a string. This is same as SAML2 EntityID.

3.3.12  \texttt{a7n = tas3\_get\_epr\_a7n(cf, epr)}

\texttt{cf}  TAS$^3$ configuration object, also used for memory allocation

\texttt{epr}  An EPR object, such as obtained from \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr()}

\texttt{return}  Assertion from EPR \texttt{<sec:Token>} field as a string.

3.3.13  \textbf{Available Implementations (Non-normative)}

This binding is implemented by php\_zxid module, available as part of the \texttt{zxid.org}
3.4 C and C++ Binding

Essentially this is a procedural C binding that is also usable from C++. In fact, the C binding can be used as a base for many other language bindings generated using SWIG [SWIG] interface generator.

The binding is declared in tas3.h and implemented in libtas3.a, libtas3.so, or libtas3.dll, depending on the platform. Typical source code file will pull in the TAS³ API by including

```
#include <tas3.h>
```

### 3.4.1 cf = *tas3_new_conf_to_cf(conf)*

**Prototype**

```
tas3_conf* tas3_new_conf_to_cf(const char* conf);
```

Create a new TAS3 configuration object given configuration string and possibly configuration file. Usually a configuration object is generated and passed around to different API calls to avoid reparsing the configuration at each API call.

*conf* Configuration string

*return* Configuration object

### 3.4.2 ses = *tas3_new_ses(cf)*

**Prototype**

```
tas3_ses* tas3_new_conf_to_cf(const char* conf);
```

Create a new TAS3 session object. Usually a session object is created just before calling

*cf* Configuration object

*return* Session object

### 3.4.3 SSO: ret = *tas3_sso_cf_ses(cf, qs_len, qs, ses, &res_len, auto_flags)*

**Prototype**

```
char* tas3_sso_cf_ses(tas3_conf* cf, int qs_len, char* qs,
                      tas3_ses* ses, int* res_len, int auto_flags);
```

Strings are length + pointer (no C string nul termination needed).

*cf* Configuration object, see *tas3_new_conf_to_cf(cf)*

*qs_len* Length of the query string. -1 = use strlen()

*qs* Query string (or POST content)

*ses* Session object, see *tas3_new_ses(cf)*. Session object is modified.

*res_len* Result parameter. If non-null, will be set to the length of the returned string
auto_flags Automation flags

return String representing protocol action or SSO attributes

Example

go

tas3_conf* cf = tas3_new_conf_to_cf("PATH=/var/tas3/");
tas3_ses* ses = tas3_new_ses(cf);
char* ret = tas3_sso_cf_ses(cf, -1, env("QUERY_STRING"), ses, 0, 0x1800);
switch (ret[0]) {
case 'd': break; /* Successful login */
... /* Processing other outcomes omitted for brevity. */
}
if (tas3_az_cf_ses(cf, "", ses)) {
    /* SSO successful and authorization permit. Do some work. */
} else {
    /* SSO successful but authorization denied */
}
}

3.4.4 Authorization: decision = tas3_az_cf_ses(cf, qs, ses)

Prototype

cchar* tas3_az_cf_ses(tas3_conf* cf, const char* qs, tas3_ses* ses);

Call Policy Decision Point (PDP) to obtain an authorization decision about a contemplated action on a resource.

cf the configuration object

qs additional attributes that are passed to PDP

ses session object, from which most attributes come

return 0 on deny (for any reason, e.g. indeterminate), or non-null if permit.

3.4.5 WSC: resp_soap = tas3_call(cf, ses, svctype, url, di_opt, az_cred, req_soap)

Prototype

struct zx_str* tas3_call(tas3_conf* cf, tas3_ses* ses, const char* svctype,
const char* url, const char* di_opt, const char* az_cred,
const char* req_soap);

cf Configuration object, see tas3_new_conf_to Cf()

ses Session object, used to locate EPRs, see tas3_new_ses()

svctype Service type and namespace URN that is applicable to the body. Passed as a string.

url (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL.

di_opt (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format
**az_cred** (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.

**req_soap** string used as SOAP body or as SOAP envelope template.

**return** SOAP envelope as a string

### 3.4.6 resp_soap = tas3_callf(cf, ses, svctype, url, di_opt, az_cred, fmt, ...)

**Prototype**

```c
char* tas3_callf(tas3_conf* cf, tas3_ses* ses, const char* svctype,
                 const char* url, const char* di_opt, const char* az_cred,
                 const char* fmt, ...);
```

The `tas3_callf()` variant, which allows `printf(3)` style formatting, is highly convenient for C programmers. Others will probably use the plan `tas3_call()` and rely on language’s native abilities to construct the string.

**cf** Configuration object, see `tas3_new_conf_to_cf()`

**ses** Session object, used to locate EPRs, see `tas3_new_ses()`

**svctype** Service type and namespace URN that is applicable to the body. Passed as a string.

**url** (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL.

**di_opt** (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format

**az_cred** (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.

**fmt** printf style format string that is used to describe the body of the call as a string. If fmt contains format specifiers, then additional arguments are used to expand these.

**return** SOAP envelope as a string

### 3.4.7 WSP: tgtnid = tas3_wsp_validate(cf, ses, az_cred, soap_req)

**Prototype**

```c
char* tas3_wsp_validate(tas3_conf* cf, tas3_ses* ses,
                        const char* az_cred, const char* soap_req);
```

**cf** TAS3 configuration object, see `tas3_new_conf()`

**ses** Session object that contains the EPR cache, see `tas3_new_ses()`

**az_cred** (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.

**soap_req** Entire SOAP envelope as a string

**return** idpnid, as a string, of the target identity of the request (rest of the information is populated to the session object, from where it can be retrieved).
3.4.8 WSP: soap = \texttt{tas3\_wsp\_decorate(cf, ses, az\_cred, soap\_resp)}

Prototype

\begin{verbatim}
tas3\_str* \texttt{tas3\_wsp\_decorate(tas3\_conf* cf, tas3\_ses* ses,}
\hspace{1em} \const char* az\_cred, \const char* soap\_resp);
\end{verbatim}

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{cf} TAS$^3$ configuration object, see \texttt{tas3\_new\_conf()}
\item \texttt{ses} Session object that contains the EPR cache
\item \texttt{az\_cred} (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.
\item \texttt{soap\_resp} XML payload as a string
\item \texttt{return} SOAP Envelope of the response, as a string, ready to be sent as HTTP response.
\end{itemize}

3.4.9 WSP: soap = \texttt{tas3\_wsp\_decoratef(cf, ses, az\_cred, fmt, \ldots)}

Prototype

\begin{verbatim}
tas3\_str* \texttt{tas3\_wsp\_decorate(tas3\_conf* cf, tas3\_ses* ses,}
\hspace{1em} \const char* az\_cred, \const char* fmt, \ldots);
\end{verbatim}

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{cf} TAS$^3$ configuration object, see \texttt{tas3\_new\_conf()}
\item \texttt{ses} Session object that contains the EPR cache
\item \texttt{az\_cred} (Optional) Additional authorization credentials or attributes, query string format.
\item \texttt{fmt} printf style format string that is used to describe the body of the response as a string. If \texttt{fmt} contains format specifiers, then additional arguments are used to expand these.
\item \texttt{return} SOAP Envelope of the response, as a string, ready to be sent as HTTP response.
\end{itemize}

3.4.10 Explicit Discovery: epr = \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr(cf, ses, svc, url, di\_opt, act, n)}

Prototype

\begin{verbatim}
tas3\_epr* \texttt{tas3\_get\_epr(tas3\_conf* cf, tas3\_ses* ses,}
\hspace{1em} \const char* svc, \const char* url, \const char* di\_opt,}
\hspace{1em} \const char* action, int n);
\end{verbatim}

First search epr cache, and if miss, go discover an EPR over the net. This is the main work horse for WSCs wishing to call WSPs via EPR.

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{cf} TAS$^3$ configuration object, also used for memory allocation
\item \texttt{ses} Session object in whose EPR cache the file will be searched
\item \texttt{svc} Service type (usually a URN)
\item \texttt{url} (Optional) If provided, this argument has to match either the ProviderID, EntityID, or actual service endpoint URL.
\item \texttt{di\_opt} (Optional) Additional discovery options for selecting the service, query string format
\end{itemize}
act  (Optional) The action, or method, that must be invokable on the service

n  How manieth matching instance is returned. 1 means first

return  EPR data structure on success, 0 on failure (no discovery EPR in cache, or not found by the
discovery service).

### 3.4.11  url = tas3_get_epr_url(cf, epr)

Prototype

tas3_str* tas3_get_epr_url(tas3_conf* cf, tas3_epr* epr);

cf  TAS3 configuration object, also used for memory allocation

epr  An EPR object, such as obtained from tas3_get_epr()

return  The <a:Address> field of an EPR as a string. This is the endpoint URL.

### 3.4.12  entityid = tas3_get_epr_entid(cf, epr)

Prototype

tas3_str* tas3_get_epr_entid(tas3_conf* cf, tas3_epr* epr);

cf  TAS3 configuration object, also used for memory allocation

epr  An EPR object, such as obtained from tas3_get_epr()

return  The <di:ProviderID> field of an EPR as a string. This is same as SAML2 EntityID.

### 3.4.13  a7n = tas3_get_epr_a7n(cf, epr)

Prototype

tas3_str* tas3_get_epr_a7n(tas3_conf* cf, tas3_epr* epr);

cf  TAS3 configuration object, also used for memory allocation

epr  An EPR object, such as obtained from tas3_get_epr()

return  Assertion from EPR <sec:Token> field as a string.

### 3.4.14  Available Implementations (Non-normative)

This binding is implemented, at least, by zxid.org open source implementation, which serves as the
reference implementation of the TAS3 core security architecture.

N.B. The tas3_sso() API is implemented by zxid’s zxid_simple() API.
3.5 Other Language Bindings

At present stage of the TAS$^3$ project (2009) we only offer Java, PHP, and C/C++ bindings, but in future we aim supporting also at least the following:

- C# / .Net / Mono
- Perl (currently \texttt{zxid.org} derived Net::SAML perl module, available from \texttt{cpan.org}, supports most functionality of TAS$^3$ API, but this is unofficial)
- Python
- Ruby

We welcome external contribution and language specialist help in making all these bindings available. Please contact Sampo Kellomäki (sampo@symlabs.com) if you are interested.
4 Deployment and Integration Models (Non-normative)

The above diagram illustrates a typical frontend-backend integration situation.

The TAS³ integration can be accomplished in several ways, from least intrusive to the original (legacy) application to more intrusive, but also more granular:

**Proxy or mediation box approach**  See also [TAS3D71IdMAnAz] Fig-8.2 "Using a Gateway for Legacy Applications". This approach is completely application independent and simply TAS³ wraps existing protocol. Limitation tends to be that TAS³ authorization and obligations have to be applied at granularity of a protocol message rather than the data in it.

**Application server filter approach** Either web server module, like mod_auth_saml, or an application server module, like Servlet Filter or AXIS2 Interceptor, is inserted to the processing stack. While software realization is quite different, this is still similar to the mediation box model.

**Application class dependent filter approach** Similar to the above filter approach, but the filter has some ability to "drill in" to the application protocol. For example, if all data in the application is represented in uniform format, such as Java Objects, then a generic filter can be supplied that applies authorization and obligations to all data represented in such way.

**API approach** This approach relies the application programmer to instrument his application with necessary authorization and other calls. We are simply trying to make his job easier by providing readily available, TAS³ certified, APIs that make the instrumenting job easy.

### 4.1 Frontend and Web Services Client Integration Model (Non-normative)

The tasks to be accomplished on the Frontend, in the direct line of call, include

1. Detect need for login (done by payload servlet)
2. Perform SSO (SP side)

3. Perform SSO, IdP side including authenticating user and shipping attributes

4. Gater additional attributes, if needed ("Attr")

5. Authorize access to FE (PEP-Rs-In of FE) ("PEP")

6. Populate session of the payload servlet ("ses")

7. Redirect user to protected resource he was trying to access on the protected resource.

8. Application dependent PEP calls PDP if needed. ("PEP")

9. Call web service, including
   a. Application dependent processing steps ("etc")
   b. Authorize the call (PEP-Rq-Out) ("PEP")
   c. Discover suitable service, performing Trust and Privacy Negotiation (may need interaction at front-end web gui) if needed. ("DIC")
   d. Decorate request with TAS3 specific SOAP headers and sign. ("WSC")

10. Perform network I/O ("HTTP"). This also includes TLS certificate authentication of the Responder and may include Client-TLS certificate authentication of the Requester.

The SSO integration is expected to be a single module, appearing as a servlet in Java realization and as an authentication module in web server realization, that handles steps 2-7 automatically. The integration is accomplished by configuring the web server without modifying the application except to add the initial detection and redirect (1) and to make use of the attributes that were populated to the session.¹ The TAS³ binary modules for SSO are generically called T3-SSO-*.

The WSC integration is expected to be a single module. It will appear as AXIS2 module in Java realization so that it can be just hooked in by configuration without any modification to the existing web service (the "etc" module illustrates that even other modules than TAS³ can be hooked in without interference²).

The API realization of WSC is a function, `tas3_call()` (see TAS³ API), that the application can call directly. If this approach is chosen, the entire web services call is handled by the API without any regard to servlet environment’s or framework’s hooking or modules. This is the most common approach in PHP, Perl, C#, C++, and C worlds.

A possible variant of WSC integration is to call `tas3_call_prepare()` to obtain the serialized SOAP envelope, then do the I/O part in application dependent way, and pass the response to `tas3_response_validate()`. Effectively `tas3_call()` does these steps with a built-in HTTP client performing the I/O part.³

### 4.1.1 Integration Using ZXID (Non-normative)

Further information about using ZXID for TAS³ is available in README.zxid-tas3, zxid-tas3.pd, and zxid-java.pd

The official TAS³ API is provided by `tas3.h` which maps the TAS³ API definitions to the underlying z nid ones.

The Java realization of SSO is provided by zxsrvlet class and servlet. This is packaged as TAS³ binary module T3-SSO-ZXID-JAVA.

The web server realization of SSO is provided by mod_auth_saml Apache module (`mod_auth_saml.so`). It is packaged as TAS³ binary module T3-SSO-ZXID-MODAUTHSAML.

¹In mod_auth_saml realization even step (1) can be accomplished by configuring the web server.
²Non-interference depends on other modules following certain common sense conventions, such as not signing SOAP <e:Headers> element and not trying to create SOAP headers that TAS3 creates (e.g. <wsse:Security>).
³In ZXID realization the HTTP client is libcurl from curl.haxx.se
API realization of SSO is provided by \texttt{zxid\_simple()} in \texttt{libzxid.a}. This is packaged as TAS\textsuperscript{3} binary module T3-SSO-ZXID-PHP.\footnote{Although not TAS3 packaged, Net::SAML perl module provides the same functionality.} Other language binding specific modules are expected in the future.
4.1.2 Integration Using Other Platforms, Frameworks, and Packages (Non-normative)

Other mainstream packages are invited to submit integration descriptions similar to previous section (ZXID). The details of the integration should be in package’s own documentation.

4.2 Web Services Provider Integration Model (Non-normative)

The tasks to be accomplished on the Service Responder, in the direct line of call, include:

- **A.** Listen for HTTP requests (typically done by platform)
- **B.** Parse and validate a web services request, e.g. call `tas3_wsp_validate()`. This involves checking for valid signature from trusted authority.
- **C.** Authorize the request, extracting from the request the pledges (in `<b:UsageDirective>`) ("PEP-Rs-In").
- **D.** Apply other filters and post processing steps ("etc")
- **E.** Authorize each data item separately using input interceptor. For queries this is usually a no-op, but for creates or updates this is meaningful. When data is accepted for the repository, the authorization step can result in obligations or sticky-policies being written into the database along side the data itself.
  
  The authorization is configurable according to Application Independent PEP configuration, described elsewhere, or Application Dependent PEP approach can be taken, calling the PDP directly ("PEP").
- **F.** Authorize each returned data item separately using input interceptor. Usually applicable to query results. The per item authorization will apply systemwide and item specific policies (sticky policies) and obligations and produce a deny or permit-with-obligations response.
  
  The authorization is configurable according to Application Independent PEP configuration, described elsewhere, or Application Dependent PEP approach can be taken, calling the PDP directly ("PEP").
- **G.** Authorize the response in aggregate ("PEP-Rs-Out"). At this stage one of the most important verifications is to compare the pledges collected in step C ("PEP-Rs-In") and filter out any data whose obligations are stricter.

  **Optimization.** It is possible to combine the pledges to obligations matching (in G) to the per result item authorization (F) by simply feeding the pledges as inputs to the PDP in (F).

  Such optimization can not, however, achieve all functionality of the G ("PEP-Rs-Out") as it is unable to see the bigger picture, i.e. consider all data together as a set. A typical example would be a rule against leaking simultaneously day and month of birth and year of birth.

- **H.** Decorate the response with TAS³ specific SOAP headers. This is typically done by calling `tas3_wsp_decorate()`.
- **I.** Send the response. This is typically done by platform dependent means.
5 Resilient Deployment Architecture (Non-normative)

This section addresses Req. D1.2-2.8-Avail.

For TAS\(^3\) services to be dependable, they need to be deployed so that they are resilient to system and network failure. Resiliency and efficiency are the first lines of defense against Denial of Service attacks that try to attack simple catastrophic vulnerabilities or overwhelm the system on the point where it is most inefficient. Resiliency needs to be considered at several layers, namely on the Front Channel and on the Back Channel.

![Diagram of Layering of resilience features for Front Channel, Back Channel, and data center Back End services.](image)

Figure 5.1: Layering of resilience features for Front Channel, Back Channel, and data center Back End services.

![Diagram of Resiliency implemented using hardware load balancers.](image)

Figure 5.2: Resiliency implemented using hardware load balancers.

Note that the virtual IP address is hosted either in hardware load balancer, or one member of a cluster. Fail-over of the virtual IP is arranged using Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP) [RFC3768].
Figure 5.3: Resiliency implemented using software load-balancing-fail-over functionality and clustering.

5.1 Zero Downtime Updates

This section addresses Req. D1.2-7.19-DynaUpd.

For continued availability of the system, Zero-Downtime-Update (ZDTU) technology SHOULD be implemented through out. If horizontal scaling path and failure recovery have been implemented, then ZDTU can be implemented easily by taking out of farm one server at a time and updating it. Downside of this approach is that the farm will temporarily be in an inconsistent state.

If consistency of the farm is at all times a requirement, no easy ZDTU approach exists. One approach is to bring up new “hot standbys” along side of the old configuration and then do instantaneous switch. As the switch over is less than 1 second, this could be considered ZDTU.

Never-the-less, as TAS3 is business process driven and as business processes can take long time to complete (if human interaction is required, this could easily mean days or weeks), thus consistent ZDTU is infeasible in practise and the business process modelling should explicitly foresee handling of upgrade situations, i.e. how old processes are handled after the general upgrade.
6 Feasibility and Performance Analysis (Non-normative)

TAS³ Architecture is rather complex so we need to analyze the runtime cost of implementing it. The cost can be divided in six categories:

- **T** Connection overhead, including TCP handshake and TLS handshake. The latter involves one public key operation on both sides, unless TLS connection cache hit is achieved. Except for the cache hit case, connection overhead is mostly unavoidable given TAS³ Architecture’s division of components. Sometimes co-locating several components in same host may allow use of localhost connection to avoid handshake overhead. The TLS overhead may be avoidable in localhost and secure internal network cases. The TCP overhead is very sensitive to latency: usually a precondition for a connection is to resolve a domain name: this means one round trip latency cost. Then actual three-way TCP handshake needs to be performed, causing three round trip latencies. Finally TLS handshake causes at least one more round trip. Therefore the time cost of a connection tends to be minimum of 5 round trip latencies. Higher the latency, more time it takes to process a call and more simultaneous calls are needed to keep up the same through put.

- **C** Communication overhead: this consists of compression, encryption (symmetric stream cipher), and transfer of the actual data. Mostly unavoidable. As communication cost and stream cipher tend to be negligible compared to TCP + TLS handshake and digital signatures, we will not consider communication cost in our calculations.

- **S** Digital signature overhead: usually at least one public key operation is involved on each side. Often responder side needs to verify several digital signatures: one for the message and one for each token or credential it receives. The signature overhead is mostly unavoidable, though some caching and session techniques may reduce it in case of often repeated actions.

- **X** XML overhead: the arcane and poorly designed features, such as namespaces and canonicalization, of XML cause significant processing overhead (not to mention bugs). In some Java implementations of digital signature processing the XML formatting consumes as much CPU as the public key operation. Even in the best of breed implementations XML formatting has significant cost, usually about 20% of the cost of a public key operation. XML cost could be eliminated by choosing a more rational data format.

- **Z** Authorization cost. Evaluation of rule set will depend heavily on the particular ruleset and its implementation technology. Some rulesets are know to take exponential time to evaluate. Authorization cost is exclusively borne by the PDP components. While a PDP may incur additional cost in validating credentials, this is not taken in account here (but can be accounted as digital signature overhead).

- **P** Payload cost. This is the cost of running the actual application and is unavoidable. Since we are trying to measure the overhead cost of TAS³ Architecture, the payload is assumed to be free.

In cost calculations we will use units with overall cost computed as show in following table:

- The cost is unevenly divided among the entities in the TAS³ trust network, but the division depends heavily on whether caching can be utilized. If the usage pattern is isolated single operations, the IdP, discovery, and credential issuance tend to become hotspots because these functions are relied on by many other players in the network. For single operations the TLS cache misses will penalize the system overall.
- If the usage pattern is repeat operations, then the bottleneck tends to shift towards responder processing: credentials can be cached, but they still need to be validated every time (some checksum based validation cache may be feasible, but has not been explored yet).

Overall bottlenecks in both cases include audit bus logging, local audit trail (especially if digitally signed), and authorization. In this analysis audit bus is assumed to work by exchanging digitally signed SOAP messages and each exchange to be authorized separately.

To explore the cost we will consider two scenarios.
Table 6.1: Units of cost computation and their RSA equivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>RSA Eq.</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>One TLS connection establishment. Not entirely RSA comparable as latency component is involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>One TLS connection establishment, with connection cache hit (avoids public key operation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>One digital signature generation or validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>One XML document parse or canonicalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>One ruleset evaluation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1 Single use of single web service

This scenario consists of user making Single Sign-On to a frontend and invoking an operation that requires calling a web service. The sequence of events and the cost is indicated in the table.

Table 6.1: Cost of TAS single use scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>IdP + Disc.</th>
<th>Frontend</th>
<th>FE PDP</th>
<th>Responder</th>
<th>Rs PDP</th>
<th>Audit Bus</th>
<th>Audit Bus PDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SSO</td>
<td>2T+4S+4X=11</td>
<td>4T+3S+5X=14</td>
<td>2T+2S+3X+Z=8.5</td>
<td>4(2T+5+3X)=28</td>
<td>4(T+2X+Z)=16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discovery</td>
<td>2T+3S+3X=9</td>
<td>T+S+X=3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2T+S+3X=7</td>
<td>t+2X+Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Trust &amp; Priv.</td>
<td>T+2X=3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2T+S+3X=7</td>
<td>T+2X+Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rq Out PEP</td>
<td>t+2X=2</td>
<td>2t+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td>t+2X+Z=2.5</td>
<td>2t+S+3X=4</td>
<td>t+2X+Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Send request</td>
<td>2T+2S+2X=9</td>
<td>t+2X=2</td>
<td>2T+3S+3X=9</td>
<td>2(2t+S+3X)=8</td>
<td>2(t+2X+Z)=5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rs In PEP</td>
<td></td>
<td>2t+S+3X=4</td>
<td>t+2X+Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Payload</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Send response</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=4</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=4</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=4</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=4</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Rq In PEP</td>
<td>t+2X=2</td>
<td>2S+2X+4X=6.5</td>
<td>2S+2X+4X=6.5</td>
<td>2S+2X+4X=6.5</td>
<td>2S+2X+4X=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Process Oblig</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. SLO</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td>2t+S+2X=3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5T+9S+12X=25</td>
<td>5T+9S+12X=25</td>
<td>5T+9S+12X=25</td>
<td>5T+9S+12X=25</td>
<td>5T+9S+12X=25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grand total is 34T+55S+154X+23Z=271.5 RSA operation equivalents.

For a fair comparison, a simple web service call without any authorization or auditing, using HTTP Basic authentication and TLS, the cost is shown in the following table. The total cost of such unsecure call is estimated as 8.5 RSA operation equivalents. The cost of a fully secure platform appears to be about 31 times that of unsecure platform.

Table 6.2: Cost of unsecure single use scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Frontend</th>
<th>Responder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Login</td>
<td>T=1.5</td>
<td>T+X=2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Send request</td>
<td>T+X=2.5</td>
<td>T+X=2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Payload</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Send response</td>
<td>X=1</td>
<td>X=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2T+4S+2X=5</td>
<td>1T+S+2X=3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.1.1 Cost without auditing

Above calculation shows that the Audit Bus substantially adds to the cost. Here’s the same calculation without Audit Bus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>IdP + Disc.</th>
<th>Frontend</th>
<th>FE PDP</th>
<th>Responder</th>
<th>Rs PDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SSO</td>
<td>1T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
<td>3T+2S+4X=10.5</td>
<td>T+S+2X+Z=5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discovery</td>
<td>1T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
<td>T+S+X=3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Trust &amp; Priv.</td>
<td>T+2X=3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rq Out PEP</td>
<td>T+2X=3.5</td>
<td>1T+1S+3X+1Z=6</td>
<td>T+2X=5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Send request</td>
<td>T+1S+1X=3.5</td>
<td>1T+2S+1X=4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>T+2X=3.5</td>
<td>1T+1S+3X+1Z=6</td>
<td>T+2X=5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Payload</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>T+2X=3.5</td>
<td>1T+1S+3X+1Z=6</td>
<td>T+2X=5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Send response</td>
<td>S+X=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Rq In PEP</td>
<td>T+2X=3.5</td>
<td>T+S+3X+Z=6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Process Oblg</td>
<td>T+X=2.5</td>
<td>T+X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. SLO</td>
<td>T+S+2X=4.5</td>
<td>T+S+2X=4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grand total without auditing is 23T+19S+45X+5Z=101 RSA operation equivalents. As can be seen, the Audit Bus represents 63% of the total cost. Most of the Audit Bus cost is actually caused by requirement to contact the bus and authorize the sending of messages. A future revision of the architecture will explore the possibility of persistent connection to the Audit Bus. This would significantly reduce the T, t, S, and Z aspects of the Audit Bus processing, though at least one signature overhead will be needed at the message source to ensure untamperability of the audit trail.

Another optimization would be to improve the authorization step of the Audit Bus, perhaps co-locating the Audit Bus PDP with the Audit Bus itself.

6.1.2 Cost without auditing and without authorization

Another recurring activity are the frequent calls to the PDPs. Following table explores how much could be saved by optimising these calls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>IdP + Disc.</th>
<th>Frontend</th>
<th>IdP + Disc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SSO</td>
<td>1T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
<td>3T+2S+4X=10.5</td>
<td>1T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discovery</td>
<td>1T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
<td>T+S+X=3.5</td>
<td>1T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Process Oblg</td>
<td>T+X=2.5</td>
<td>T+X=2.5</td>
<td>T+X=2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Payload</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Send response</td>
<td>S+X=2</td>
<td>S+X=2</td>
<td>S+X=2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grand total without audit and without authorization is 12T+14S+19X+0Z=51 RSA operation equivalents. The authorization steps (excluding Audit Bus related authorization) seem to be adding about as much over head as the entire rest of the web service call.

The bare ID-WSF 2.0 web service call compares relatively favorably with bare unsecure web service call: 51 vs. 8.5 - only 6 times heavier.
### 6.1.3 Cost without XML

Since XML processing is needlessly expensive, let’s analyze what the cost could be with non-XML protocols like RESTful approach using Simple Web Tokens [Hartr09].

**Table 6.5: Cost of TAS3 single use scenario without XML**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>IdP + Disc</th>
<th>Frontend</th>
<th>FE PDP</th>
<th>Responder</th>
<th>Rs PDP</th>
<th>Audit Bus</th>
<th>Audit Bus PDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SSO</td>
<td>2T+4S=7</td>
<td>4T+3S+9</td>
<td>2T+2S+Z=5.5</td>
<td>4T+3S+9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4T+S=8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discovery</td>
<td>2T+3S=6</td>
<td>T+8=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>4T+Z=2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Trust &amp; Priv.</td>
<td>T=1.5</td>
<td>t+8=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T+8=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>T=1.5</td>
<td>2T+2S+Z=5.5</td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>4T+Z=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Send request</td>
<td>2T+2S=5</td>
<td>2T+3S=6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>2T+Z=4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>T=1.5</td>
<td>t=1.5</td>
<td>2T+2S+Z=5.5</td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>4T+Z=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Payload</td>
<td></td>
<td>t=1.5</td>
<td>2T+2S+Z=5.5</td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>2T+Z=4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>T=1.5</td>
<td>2T+2S+Z=5.5</td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>4T+Z=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Send response</td>
<td>T=1.5</td>
<td>t+8=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T+8=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>T=1.5</td>
<td>2T+2S+Z=5.5</td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>4T+Z=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Process Obli</td>
<td>T+2S=4</td>
<td>T+8=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T+8=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. SLO</td>
<td>2T+2S=5</td>
<td>2T+2S=5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td>2T+Z=4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7T+9S=19.5</td>
<td>14T+1S=32</td>
<td>6T+6S+3Z=16.5</td>
<td>7T+6S=16.5</td>
<td>30T+18S=72</td>
<td>18T+S+X+18Z=36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without the XML, but otherwise fully featureful architecture leads to grand total of 94T+55S+0X+23Z=207.5 RSA equivalents. Thus eliminating XML can lead to over 40% of savings.

### 6.2 Session of 3 frontends and five web services

This session is meant to illustrate the types of savings available from caching discovery results.

The three frontends are all accessed in the same single sign-on session, leading to savings at IdP. Each frontend then calls two web services. One (A) is common, shared web service. Other (B) is new web service (new for each frontend), but the service is called 4 times, which leads to EPR cache hits. The pattern also encourages TLS cache hits. We also assume repeated calls to PDP and audit bus lead to TLS cache hits.

**Table 6.6: Cost of TAS3 multi use scenario**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>IdP + Disc</th>
<th>Frontend</th>
<th>FE PDP</th>
<th>Responders</th>
<th>Rs PDP</th>
<th>Audit Bus</th>
<th>Audit Bus PDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SSO w/ auth</td>
<td>2T+4S+4X=11</td>
<td>4T+3S+3X=14</td>
<td>2T+2S+3X+Z=8.5</td>
<td>4T+2S+3X=28</td>
<td>4T+2S+3X=10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discovery</td>
<td>2T+3S+3X=6</td>
<td>T+8=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2T+S=4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Trust &amp; Priv.</td>
<td>T+2S=3.5</td>
<td>t+8=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T+8=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>t+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Send request</td>
<td>T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1+3S+3X=7.5</td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>T+2S=3.5</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+Z=9.5</td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Payload</td>
<td>t+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>T+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+3X+Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Send response</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Process Obli</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Discovery</td>
<td>2T+3S+3X=6</td>
<td>T+8=2</td>
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<td>T+8=2</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Trust &amp; Priv.</td>
<td>T+2S=3.5</td>
<td>t+8=2</td>
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<td>T+8=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>t+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Send request</td>
<td>T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1+3S+3X=7.5</td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>T+2S=3.5</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+Z=9.5</td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Payload</td>
<td>t+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>t+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Send response</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Process Obli</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Send request</td>
<td>2T+2S+2X=4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2T+S+3X=6</td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>t+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Payload</td>
<td>t+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>t+2S=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Send response</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=2</td>
<td>2T+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=3X=7</td>
<td>2T+S=2X=2.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Process Obli</td>
<td>t+2S+2X=3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2(2S+3X+3X)</td>
<td>2(2S+2X+Z=5)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.6 (continued): Cost of TAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>IdP + Disc.</th>
<th>Frontend</th>
<th>FE PDP</th>
<th>Responders</th>
<th>Rs PDPs</th>
<th>Audit Bus</th>
<th>Audit Bus PDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91. SSO ses act</td>
<td>+4S+4X+8</td>
<td>2+6S+3X+14</td>
<td>2+2S+3X+Z=8.5</td>
<td>4(2+5S+3X)+28</td>
<td>4(2+X+Z)=10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92. Discovery A</td>
<td>2+6S+3X+6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93. Trust &amp; Priv.</td>
<td>+2X+3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94. Rq Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95. Send request</td>
<td>T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>T+2X=3.5</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=9.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97. Payload</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99. Send response</td>
<td>+2S+2X+4</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>100. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>101. Process Obl</td>
<td>2t+S+2X+3</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102. Discovery D</td>
<td>2t+3S+3X=6</td>
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<tr>
<td>103. Trust &amp; Priv.</td>
<td>+2X=2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=9.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104. Rq Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105. Send request</td>
<td>T+2S+2X=5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>T+2X=3.5</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=9.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107. Payload</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109. Send response</td>
<td>+2S+2X+4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111. Process Obl</td>
<td>2t+S+2X+3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112. Rq Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113. Send request</td>
<td>2t+3S+3X=6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>+2X=2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115. Payload</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117. Send responses</td>
<td>+2S+2X+4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119. Process Obl</td>
<td>2t+S+2X+3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120. Rq Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121. Send request</td>
<td>2t+3S+3X=6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>+2X=2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123. Payload</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125. Send responses</td>
<td>+2S+2X+4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127. Process Obl</td>
<td>2t+S+2X+3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128. Rq Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129. Send request</td>
<td>2t+3S+3X=6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>+2X=2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131. Payload</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132. Rs Out PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+1Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133. Send responses</td>
<td>+2S+2X+4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134. Rs In PEP</td>
<td>+2X+2</td>
<td>2+2S+4X+Z=6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2+s+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135. Process Obl</td>
<td>2t+S+2X+3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136. SLO</td>
<td>2t+2S+3X=8</td>
<td>2T+2S+3X=8</td>
<td></td>
<td>2t+S+3X=4</td>
<td>+2X+2Z=2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>101+12S+45X</td>
<td>26t+2S+17/4X</td>
<td>6t+66S+129X+33Z</td>
<td>12t+90S+165X</td>
<td>24t+66S+138X+39Z</td>
<td>2t+176S+528X</td>
<td>1+355X+17/0Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL RSA</td>
<td>=92</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>=220.5</td>
<td>=273</td>
<td>=255</td>
<td>=158</td>
<td>=443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This sequence of 15 web service calls has grand total of 116T+522S+1531X+239Z=2346.5 RSA equivalents, which works out to about 156 RSA equivalents per web service call. As can be seen the cache effects and amortization of the SSO and discovery over several calls makes a significant impact. The amortized cost is 58% of the single call cost. Effectively the amortized calls are 18 times heavier than plain web service calls.
7 Annex: Examples

These XML blobs, taken from [ZXIDREADME], are for reference only. They are not normative. They have been pretty printed. Indentation indicates nesting level and closing tags have been abbreviated as "</>". The actual XML on the wire generally does not have any whitespace.

7.1 SAML 2.0 Artifact Response with SAML 2.0 SSO Assertion and Two Bootstraps

Both bootstraps illustrate SAML assertion as bearer token.

```
<soap:Envelope
    xmlns:lib="urn:liberty:iff:2003-08"
    xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
    xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
    <soap:Body>
        <sp:ArtifactResponse
            xmlns:sp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
            ID="REvgoIIlkzTmk-aIX6tKE"
            InResponseTo="RfAsltVf2"
            IssueInstant="2007-02-10T05:38:15Z"
            Version="2.0">
            <sa:Issuer
                xmlns:sa="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
                Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
                https://a-idp.liberty-iop.org:8881/idp.xml
            </sa:Issuer>
            <sp:Status>
            </sp:Status>
        </sp:ArtifactResponse>
        <sp:Response
            xmlns:sp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
            ID="RCCzu13z77SiSXqsFp1u1"
            InResponseTo="NojFIIhxw"
            IssueInstant="2007-02-10T05:37:42Z"
            Version="2.0">
            <sa:Issuer
                xmlns:sa="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
                Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
                https://a-idp.liberty-iop.org:8881/idp.xml
            </sa:Issuer>
            <sp:Status>
            </sp:Status>
        </sp:Response>
        <sp:Assertion
            xmlns:sa="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
            ID="ASSE6bgfaV-sapQsAilXOvBu"
            IssueInstant="2007-02-10T05:37:42Z"
            Version="2.0">
            <sa:Issuer
                Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
                https://a-idp.liberty-iop.org:8881/idp.xml
            </sa:Issuer>
            <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
                <ds:SignedInfo>
```

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<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
<ds:Reference URI="#ASSE6bgfaV-sapQsAi1X0v8u"/>
<ds:Transforms>
  <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
  <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
  <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
  <ds:DigestValue>r8OvtNmq5LkYwCNg6bsR2ADTv4NE="/>
<ds:SignatureValue>GTWVzHYW54ioHk/C7zjDRTThorlpwC4="/>

<sa:Subject>
  <sa:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent">
    PB5fLIA4lRU2bH4HkQsn9
  </sa:NameID>
  <sa:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
    <sa:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="2007-02-10T06:37:41Z" Recipient="https://sp1.zxidsp.org:8443/zxidhlo?o=B"></sa:SubjectConfirmationData>
  </sa:SubjectConfirmation>
  <sa:Conditions NotBefore="2007-02-10T05:32:42Z" NotOnOrAfter="2007-02-10T06:37:42Z">
    <sa:AudienceRestriction>
    </sa:AudienceRestriction>
  </sa:Conditions>
</sa:Subject>

<sa:Subject>
  <sa:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
    https://a-idp.liberty-iop.org:8881/idp.xml
  </sa:NameID>
  <sa:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
    <sa:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="2007-02-10T06:37:41Z" Recipient="https://sp1.zxidsp.org:8443/zxidhlo?o=B"></sa:SubjectConfirmationData>
  </sa:SubjectConfirmation>
  <sa:Conditions NotBefore="2007-02-10T05:32:42Z" NotOnOrAfter="2007-02-10T06:37:42Z">
    <sa:AudienceRestriction>
    </sa:AudienceRestriction>
  </sa:Conditions>
</sa:Subject>

<sa:Assertion ID="CREDOTGAvhNoPlaiTq4bxBg" IssueInstant="2007-02-10T05:37:42Z" Version="2.0">
  <sa:Issuer Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
    https://a-idp.liberty-iop.org:8881/idp.xml
  </sa:Issuer>
    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
    <ds:Reference URI="#CREDOTGAvhNoPlaiTq4bxBg"/>
    <ds:Transforms>
      <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
      <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2010/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
      <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
      <ds:DigestValue>dqq/28hw5eEv+ceFyiLImeJ1P8w="/>
<ds:SignatureValue>UKlEgHKwuoCE="/>
<sa:Subject>
  <sa:NameID/>
  <sa:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"></sa:SubjectConfirmation>
<sa:Conditions>

<!-- This assertion is the credential for the ID-WSF 1.1 bootstrap (below). -->

<sa:Assertion ID="CREDOTGAvhNoPlaiTq4bxBg" IssueInstant="2007-02-10T05:37:42Z" Version="2.0">
  <sa:Issuer Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
    https://a-idp.liberty-iop.org:8881/idp.xml
  </sa:Issuer>
    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
    <ds:Reference URI="#CREDOTGAvhNoPlaiTq4bxBg"/>
    <ds:Transforms>
      <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
      <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2010/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
      <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
      <ds:DigestValue>dqq/28hw5eEv+ceFyiLImeJ1P8w="/>
<ds:SignatureValue>UKlEgHKwuoCE="/>
<sa:Subject>
  <sa:NameID/>
  <sa:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"></sa:SubjectConfirmation>
<sa:Conditions>
NotBefore="2007-02-10T05:32:42Z"
NotOnOrAfter="2007-02-10T06:37:42Z">
<sa:AudienceRestriction>
</sa:AudienceRestriction>
<sa:AuthnStatement
AuthnInstant="2007-02-10T05:37:42Z"
SessionIndex="1171085858-4">
<sa:AuthnContext>
<sa:AuthnContextClassRef>
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Password
</sa:AuthnContextClassRef>
</sa:AuthnContext>
</sa:AuthnStatement>

<!-- Regular attribute -->
<sa:Attribute
Name="cn"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">
<sa:AttributeValue>Sue</sa:AttributeValue>
</sa:Attribute>

<!-- ID-WSF 1.1 Bootstrap for discovery. See also the Advice, above. -->
<sa:Attribute
Name="DiscoveryResourceOffering"
NameFormat="urn:liberty:disco:2003-08">
<sa:AttributeValue>
<di12:ResourceOffering
xmlns:di12="urn:liberty:disco:2003-08"
entryID="2">
<di12:ResourceID>
<di12:ServiceInstance>
<di12:ServiceType>urn:liberty:disco:2003-08</di12:ServiceType>
<di12:Description>
<di12:CredentialRef>CREDOTGAhNoPlaiTq4bXBg</di12:CredentialRef>
<di12:Abstract>Symlabs Discovery Service Team G</di12:Abstract>
</di12:ServiceInstance>
</di12:ResourceOffering>
</sa:Attribute>

<!-- ID-WSF 2.0 Bootstrap for Discovery. The credential (bearer token) is inline. -->
<sa:Attribute
Name="urn:liberty:disco:2006-08:DiscoveryEPR"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
<sa:AttributeValue>
<wsa:EndpointReference
xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"
xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
notOnOrAfter="2007-02-10T07:37:42Z"
wsu:Id="EPRIDcjP80o9ln47SDj09b37">
</wsa:EndpointReference>
</sa:Attribute>
N.B. The AttributeStatement/Attribute/AttributeValue/EndpointReference/Metadata/SecurityContext/Token/Assertion/Conditions/AudienceRestriction/Audience is the same as the IdP because in many products the IdP and Discovery Service roles are implemented by the same entity. Note also that the audience of the inner assertion is the discovery service where as the audience of the outer assertion is the SP that will eventually call the Discovery Service.

7.2 ID-WSF 2.0 Call with X509v3 Sec Mech
The salient features of the above XML blob are

- Signature that covers relevant SOAP headers and Body
- Absence of any explicit identity token.

Absence of identity token means that from the headers it is not possible to identify the target identity. The signature generally conveys the Invoker identity (the WSC that is calling the service). Since one WSC typically serves many principals, knowing which principal is impossible. For this reason X509 security mechanism is seldom used in ID-WSF 2.0 world (with ID-WSF 1.1 the ResourceID provides an alternative way of identifying the principal, thus making X509 a viable option).

### 7.3 ID-WSF 2.0 Call with Bearer (Binary) Sec Mech

The signature generally conveys the Invoker identity (the WSC that is calling the service). Since one WSC typically serves many principals, knowing which principal is impossible. For this reason X509 security mechanism is seldom used in ID-WSF 2.0 world (with ID-WSF 1.1 the ResourceID provides an alternative way of identifying the principal, thus making X509 a viable option).
xmlns:wsa="http://www.w3.org/2005/03/addressing">

<e:Header>
<wsa:MessageID wsu:Id="MID">...</>
<wsa:To wsu:Id="TO">...</>
<wsa:Action wsu:Id="ACT">urn:xx:Query</>
<wsse:Security mustUnderstand="1">
<wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="TS">
<wsu:Created>2005-06-17T04:49:17Z</></>
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken ValueType="anyNSPrefix:ServiceSessionContext"
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"
wsu:Id="BST">
mQEMAzRniWkAAAEH9RWir0eKDkyFAB7PoFazx3ftpOVWwbbqXdgxX8fpEqSr1v4
YqUc7OMiJcBtKBp3+j1D4HPuaurIqHA0vrdMpmMsPZnN1ld8f/mXCy3XbWhiL
VT4ry9ytpXB1ueO93X8RU4eC2cDm9e+IEG+qJnvgrGac1Nw5K/CJEOUUjh
oGTRYm0ziutezhrw/g0eLVtkywsmGDr77gW2xRvw01w1ogTtCeuRBIDAN+KvZ
vLKIICaGAUN1jkiDgtl=</>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:Reference URI="#MID">...</>
<ds:Reference URI="#TO">...</>
<ds:Reference URI="#ACT">...</>
<ds:Reference URI="#TS">...</>
<ds:Reference URI="#BST">...</>
<ds:Reference URI="#BDY">...
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>YgGfS0pi56pu</></></>

<e:Body wsu:Id="BDY">
<xx:Query/></>

7.4 ID-WSF 2.0 Call with Bearer (SAML) Sec Mech

<envelope xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmns:eb="urn:lib:eb:2005-11"
xmns:sec="urn:lib:sec:2005-11"
xmns:wse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-sec:200401-wss-sec:utility-1.0.x"
xmns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2005/08/addressing"
xmns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
<e:Header>
<sbf:Framework version="2.0-simple" e:mustUnderstand="1">
<wsa:MessageID wsu:Id="MID">...</>
<wsa:To wsu:Id="TO">...</>
<wsa:Action wsu:Id="ACT">urn:xx:Query</>
<wsse:Security mustUnderstand="1">
<wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="TS">
<wsu:Created>2005-06-17T04:49:17Z</></>

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<sa:Assertion
  xmlns:sa="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
  Version="2.0"
  ID="A7N123"
  <ds:Signature>...</ds:Signature>
  <sa:Subject>
    <sa:EncryptedID>
      <xenc:EncryptedData>U2XTCNvRX7Bl1NK182nmY00TEk==</xenc:EncryptedData>
      <xenc:EncryptedKey>...</xenc:EncryptedKey>
    </sa:EncryptedID>
    <sa:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"/>
    <sa:Conditions
      NotBefore="2005-04-01T16:57:20Z"
      NotOnOrAfter="2005-04-01T21:42:43Z">
      <sa:AudienceRestrictionCondition>
      </sa:AudienceRestrictionCondition>
      <sa:AuthnStatement
        AuthnInstant="2005-04-01T16:57:30.000Z"
        SessionIndex="6345789">
        <sa:AuthnContext>
          <sa:AuthnContextClassRef>
            urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport
          </sa:AuthnContextClassRef>
        </sa:AuthnContext>
        <sa:AttributeStatement>
          <sa:EncryptedAttribute>
            <xenc:EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element">
              mQEMAzRniWkAAAEH9RbzqKdgxcX8fpEqSr1v4=</xenc:EncryptedData>
              <xenc:EncryptedKey>...</xenc:EncryptedKey>
            </sa:EncryptedAttribute>
          </sa:AttributeStatement>
        </sa:EncryptedAttribute>
      </sa:AuthnStatement>
    </sa:Conditions>
  </sa:Subject>
  <wsse:SecurityTokenReference
    xmlns:wsse11="..."
    wsu:Id="STR1"
    wsse11:TokenType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-saml-token-profile-1.1#SAMLV2.0">
    <wsse:KeyIdentifier
      ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-saml-token-profile-1.1#SAMLID">
      A7N123
    </wsse:KeyIdentifier>
  </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
  <ds:Signature>
    <ds:Reference URI="#MID">...</ds:Reference>
    <ds:Reference URI="#T0">...</ds:Reference>
    <ds:Reference URI="#ACT">...</ds:Reference>
    <ds:Reference URI="#TS">...</ds:Reference>
    <ds:Reference URI="#STR1">
      <ds:Transform Algorithm="#STR-Transform">
        <wsse:TransformationParameters
          xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssec-secext-1.0.xsd">
          <wsse:ProtocolStepMethod Algorithm="#SAMLV2.0"/>
        </wsse:TransformationParameters>
      </ds:Transform>
    </ds:Reference URI="#BDY"/>
  </ds:Reference>
  <e:Body wsu:Id="BDY">
    <xx:Query/>
  </e:Body>
</Assertion>
Note how the <Subject> and the attributes are encrypted such that only the WSP can open them. This protects against WSC gaining knowledge of the NameID at the WSP.
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